






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
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P R I N C E T O N

R E V I E W .

*Benj B Warfield*

By Whom, all things; for Whom, all things.

*1853*

*FIFTY-EIGHTH YEAR.*

JANUARY--JUNE.

NEW YORK.

1882.



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## CAN AMERICANS COMPETE IN THE OCEAN CARRYING TRADE?

IT was not a matter of surprise to our people that many of our ships disappeared from the high seas during the civil war, and that at its close we retained a small part only of the great fleet of merchant vessels which had carried our flag proudly to the most distant ports of trade. It was readily understood that circumstances were adverse to them in many ways. They were liable to be intercepted by rebel cruisers. They were obliged to pay war risks, and merchandise carried in them must pay war risks. There was a scarcity of seamen, and rates of interest were very high. We were consuming at home an undue proportion of the products of our farms, we were exporting no manufactures. Our industries were demoralized by an irredeemable currency, which fluctuated in value from day to day.

And when the war was over no one felt surprise that we did not at once move to take again our old place in navigation. There were no rebel cruisers afloat and no great armies afoot; but, saving these exceptions, the unsatisfactory conditions created by the civil war remained with us, and were aggravated by the policy which was at once entered upon by the government in relation to the national debt and the currency. In the midst of the demoralization of our industries we sought to pay off large blocks of the debt and did so, and we sought with undue haste to resume specie payments. The consequence was that taxation of all kinds was kept up to a high point, and that contraction of the currency made real values grow less and often disappear.



It was possible for the most casual observer to appreciate the situation thus described and its logical results. But the time has at length arrived when the country regards with concern the fact that altho the war has long passed; altho the evils which followed in its train have largely disappeared; altho industries of all kind have revived, and the national prosperity has become greater than ever before—our navigation interests have steadily declined, and at the moment seem threatened with extinction.

During all these years we have heard uniformly the same assertions advanced by the few remaining ship-builders of the country. "Wait a little," they have said, "and we will be able to build ships as cheaply as any other people can, and then the natural aptitude of our merchants and sailors will assert itself, and the nation will be able to take again a strong position in the world's commerce." During all these years we have found nevertheless that the desired end has become further off than ever apparently, and we see fewer prospects of a change than we did when it was possible to attribute the whole situation to the civil war.

It may be as well to say at once, that careful observers do not now hope for any great revival of our shipping interests in the near future.

It is patent to such persons that the United States cannot become again, unless indeed by some sort of economic revolution which is not at all to be expected at the moment, successful builders of ships in competition with the English. In the days of clipper ships we did build vessels at less cost than other people, and it was possible for us to take a very prominent part in navigation. But now iron ships, and notably iron steamships, have succeeded wooden vessels; and these we cannot build as cheaply as the English do—probably not as cheaply as some of the Continental States. We can of course, if we choose to do so, buy ships in England and run them in competition with English or other ships, but this will not place us on an even footing with our opponents. The nation which builds ships has great advantages in ship using; we proved this in the years anterior to the war, and we may as well acknowledge the fact now. For home customers have closer knowledge of the market for ships

than strangers, and they are able to make purchases upon more favorable terms as to the time and manner of payment.

But aside from this, there are two great reasons why our efforts to build up shipping interests must be expected to meet with but moderate success. I do not refer now to obstacles which have been placed in the way by legislation. I am supposing that a free field of competition is opened for us by the entire withdrawal of all legislative disabilities. This might be done, and it may be done at any moment; for it is reasonable to believe that we will not long follow up a policy which is inherently vicious, and which is becoming recognized as such.

The two reasons why our progress in ship-building must be slow will be found in the fact that our opponents—the English at least—have great advantages over us arising from existing conditions of navigation interests in our respective countries, and from differences of commercial policy.

To take up the latter point first: It is not possible, as I believe, to deny the proposition that the free-trade system is more favorable to an interchange of products and merchandise than the system of protection. I do not mean to make an argument here that free trade is better for the state at large than protection; it is not necessary to my general argument that I should do so. All that I wish to assert is, that the interest of the ship-owner and that of the importing or exporting merchant lies in the direction of free trade. It is because the protectionist feels this to be true that he is a protectionist. It is because the free-trader believes it to be true that he is a free-trader. There is no dispute upon the point, and there can be none.

Yet it may be desirable for greater clearness to make some special applications of the principle. These have been made again and again, but their pertinency is such that they will bear repeating. Suppose, then, that there is a country—Australia for instance—which wants our grain. Suppose that Australia has to give us in return wool, and nothing else. Now under the free-trade system we would send the grain to her and take her wool, but under the system of protection we decline to take the wool and must run the risk of losing the market for our grain.

Suppose again that there is a country—Chili, for instance—which wants our cotton goods and is prepared to give us in re-

turn copper, which she produces largely. We reject her copper, by our tariff, and so we run the risk of losing the opportunity to supply her with cotton goods.

Suppose again that there is a country—Java, for instance—which wants our mineral oil, and has to give us in return coffee and sugar. We limit our demand for her products by our tariff on sugar and by favoring other sugar producers, and so she has less to pay us with, and will as a consequence take less of what we have to sell.

These are salient instances of the repressive effects of our tariff upon the interests of carriers. In every direction such repressive tendencies are operative. We can make a clearer exhibition of the fact by citing special instances as above, yet the result is not different when the countries with which we trade largely are considered. We practically shut out foreign iron. There would be a large trade in it if we should admit it free of duty; and so it is through the whole list of manufactures.

England as a free-trade state then, and other countries which adhere to free trade, must be expected to lead us in ocean navigation. The wool which we reject she accepts. She accepts also the copper and the sugar which we discriminate against, and so through the list. As a consequence, for English ships which take away from home English merchandise there are always return cargoes. There is no sailing of ships over the broad seas in ballast, but a constant interchange of commerce which enriches the merchant and the carrier, and which, so far at least, tends to enrich the states concerned.

The other reason why we cannot expect the rapid development of navigation interests will be considered by practical men a strong one. We have lost our hold upon the world's carrying-trade. It has passed into the hands of others, and those who now enjoy it possess a great advantage in the fact. For them the ships already exist and are at work. For us fleets must be created. For them there is the habit of this particular enterprise among capitalists, mechanics, and seamen. For us the habit of seafaring enterprise in all its branches must be developed. For them there is possession, and all which possession implies. For us there is left not even the courage to make a good fight,



which is born of success and is as necessary in the contests of peace as in those of war.

It is idle, then, to suppose that under any ordinary circumstances we may expect a rapid revival of our shipping interests. We must make a long and stubborn struggle if we are to succeed in any great measure.

What elements are there, then, which favor us in this matter, and what are the chances that a serious effort to re-establish ourselves in possession of some fair share of the carrying-trade of the world will be successful?

I find no discouragement in my consideration of the subject. I find that our people have aptitude for seafaring enterprises; I find that the field for such enterprises is so vast that any honest unhampered worker in it may expect a measure of success; I find that some portion of the world's trade belongs to us as of natural right, and that we have only to make the effort in order to possess ourselves of it.

It is of course easy for an American to assume that his country-people are able to do anything which has been done or is being done by any other people. We are not deficient in self-appreciation, yet it is not too much to claim that as a nation we have aptitude for the sea and for all enterprises which pertain to the sea. The nautical habit is entirely natural to the citizens of our northern seacoast line, and to an extent to those of all our coasts, from Maine to Texas and from California to Alaska. On both oceans we have extensive fisheries, which form schools for officers and men of the most practical sort. We have not relinquished entirely the pursuit of the whale fisheries. We have an extensive coasting trade in vessels of all classes and sizes. We have still some remnant of the great fleet of deep-sea vessels which at one time were known of and remarked by all men. We have a larger number of steam craft engaged in the navigation of interior waters than any other people. We have made a name even in naval warfare, alike in the struggle of 1812 and during our civil war. Our clipper ships have never been surpassed in speed nor in seagoing qualities, saving so far as iron has contributed to make the ships of the present day stronger and more enduring than wooden ones can be. We have built

some few steamships which will compare favorably with the best specimens of European construction.

One of the fairest fields for the observation of the relative qualities of the people of different states in the matter of seamanship has been the China coast for the last forty years. The treaty ports of that country and of Japan have been open to all vessels alike for international exchanges and for the domestic trade. It was my fortune to live in China for nearly twenty years, and during that time I never once heard the nautical qualities of my countrymen called in question. In point of fact this could not well have been done, for the reason that we led all other competitors in the navigation of the rivers of China and took a large part in coast navigation. To-day our flag has disappeared there as the result of causes which do not discredit our enterprise nor our aptitude for seamanship, but many Americans still find employment in that quarter in the ships of other countries.

As a matter of fact, as I believe, the American officer is, if anything, superior. This was thought to be so in the clipper-ship days, when the quick voyages made were in part attributed to the driving habits of our commanders. And to-day if one goes among the few remaining ship-owners of the country he will hear that an American officer is to be preferred even at higher rates of pay.

In the matter of aptitude, then, whether in the building, the management, or the running of ships, I see no reason to believe that we have anything to fear. Our navy itself, the *personnel* of which is unexcelled by that of any other power, has at the moment a redundant number of officers, and could furnish commanders and officers for more lines of ocean steamers than we could put afloat in a score of years.

The opportunities for Americans in navigation are limited, as I have already indicated, by the commercial policy of the country, and by the fact that the people of other countries, notably England, have gotten the advantage of a long start ahead of us. Yet how vast is the field, and how true it is that some advantages rest with the latest competitors!

Our coasting trade is reserved to our own ships by law, and this embraces not only the navigation between our Atlantic

ports and between the ports of our possessions on the Pacific, but also the trade between our Atlantic ports and those of the Pacific. We are a nation of magnitude and given to the interchange of commodities, so that this field of itself is a large one, and quite capable, if well worked, of forming forever the nursery of the greater navigation enterprises which we may expect to enter upon.

From our greater ports again, those of the Atlantic and Pacific seaboards alike, we have much to export. From Boston, New York, Philadelphia, Baltimore, and New Orleans grain in limitless quantities, cotton, farm produce of all kinds, meats, wool, hides, etc.; from our Pacific ports grain, wine, hides, fish, etc. At all these ports imports are received in greater or less quantities. Now, in all this trade the American-owned ship should have certain advantages over her rivals at large. Exporters and importers come naturally to be ship-owners, or allied with the ship-owning interest, and the result is a certain discrimination in favor of home-owned vessels. Nor are we destitute of advantages on the more distant routes. It might be possible to send a ship to China laden with cotton goods, to sail her thence to San Francisco laden with tea, thence to London with grain, and thence again to New York with a general cargo. One might start from New York with cotton goods, with cars and engines, and iron ware, heavy and light, for Valparaiso, go thence to Callao, load there with guano for Japan, and sail again for Australia and America with teas. These are instances of what sailing ships may find to do, or steamships of suitable build, on round-the-world voyages; but they are not by any means all which may be cited. England, with characteristic breadth and courage in the carrying out of any policy upon which she enters, admits us not only to all the ports of all her possessions, but freely to the carrying-trade of her own home coasts. There is no great nation which imposes any disabilities whatever upon our vessels engaged in commerce between her ports and those of the world at large. Differential duties, saving only some exceptions with ourselves, are things of the past; and it is not a little to our credit that in the face of many declarations as to the unwisdom of the policy, we have done what we could to free our vessels from the burdens of the system at home and abroad.

There is no reason then, as I believe, why, so far as the real necessities and conditions of our situation *vis-à-vis* the ocean carrying-trade are concerned, we should not again take a prominent part in it. There are certain adventitious obstacles, it is true, which prevent us from doing so. These have been declared and explained for years, but continue to exist. Yet I am sanguine enough to think that the day is not distant when our people will insist upon brushing them away, notwithstanding the eager protests of interested parties, and in setting our commerce free to attain to some part of its normal magnitude.

We have heard much of protection to ship-builders. Has any one heard of the protection of ship owners? Yet right here is a most important distinction, and one which, by a singular failure, has been completely lost sight of in all our legislation.

A ship exists not for the interest of the builder, but of the owner. The ship-builder is as much the dependant of the ship-owner as is the master who sails her. It cannot be otherwise in the nature of things. The ship is created for use. The owner pays for her creation in order to use her. The responsibility of paying for her and of running her is his, and his alone.

It is obvious, then, that if the government should protect any one it should protect the owner; but this is exactly what we have *not* done. We have protected ship-builders; that is to say, we have made laws so that the ship-owners of the country may build no ships excepting at home, and may buy none saving those which have been built at home. In doing this we have imposed a grievous burden upon our ship-owners and done no good to ship-builders. For it is evident that if an American builder can build ships as cheaply as foreign ship-builders, he needs no protection, so called; while if he cannot do so, the ship-owner cannot afford to buy his vessels. Competition upon the high seas is open to all comers, and the owner who is limited to a dearer market than others for the purchase of vessels must inevitably, all other things being equal, yield the field to his competitors.

Nor is it altogether an even chance which our ship-owning class would have if our builders could make ships as cheaply as foreigners. A ship is an expensive structure, and it deteriorates rapidly. For these reasons those which are not in profitable

employment are often sold at rates more or less below their cost or ordinary value.

It is difficult to say how much more it costs to build an ocean steamer in this country than in England. It may have cost during the civil war twice as much, and it is not likely that the difference against our builders now is less than twenty to thirty per cent. To say nothing of the greater certainty of successful workmanship which attends ship-building in countries where the industry is carried on largely, and not to speak of the opportunities to buy ships not in successful use at low rates, the difference in first cost would be sufficient of itself to put our ship owning class out of competition.

We need, then, in the first place to repeal all laws which limit ship-owners to the home market for the building and purchase of ships, allowing them to give their orders and make their purchases wherever they may find it of advantage to do so. They have to compete with all comers, and it is only just that they should have all opportunities to do so on the best possible terms.

It may be remarked here in passing, that the real interest of the ship-builder is not different from that of the ship-owner. If the latter prospers the former will have ships to repair and ships to build. If he is driven from his avocation he leaves the builder with empty yards. And so it is true that the very privileges which have been cherished by builders have come to be the cause of their destruction.

But the laws which limit the owner to the home market for the purchase of ships are not the only ones which should be swept from the statute books. There are others, for instance, which require him to employ Americans only to command his ships, and as officers. Under the sanction of law, various high charges are made in home ports and abroad for registry fees, tonnage dues, and consular services. Seamen can be discharged abroad, even when their terms of service have expired, only upon payment of extra wages, etc. In these directions the legislation of the general government is at fault, and after Congress has exhausted itself in unwisdom, the States come in and subject vessels within their jurisdiction to taxation for local purposes, and to the payment of compulsory pilotage dues.



It is not necessary to enter upon the details of the burdens which are thus placed upon ship-owners. If the ship-owners of all other countries were subjected to the like burdens trade at large might suffer indeed, but Americans would have an equal chance of success. But other States have been wiser or more fortunate in their legislation, and so an unequal contest has to be made with their vessels.

It is possible for Congress to remedy the more important evils which have been pointed out. Possibly Congress might interdict even the taxation of ships by the States, and control pilotage. However this may be, it is evident that the whole situation deserves the careful consideration of Congress, the States, and the country.

New York has already led off in the direction of reform by abandoning the taxation of vessels. This is a great step, and she can afford now to turn attention to lesser matters, as for instance to the pilotage question. And perhaps she might assert her pre-eminence in commerce by taking steps to provide for the efficient examination of persons who aspire to command ships or to act as officers. The general government has never taken action in this direction, and the consequence is that American masters and officers are frequently ignorant of some of the most important work which devolves upon them. Many, for instance, cannot calculate their position at sea by night, and some profess contempt for the laws of storms, and are as likely to plunge recklessly into the centre of a cyclone as to anticipate its course and sail off on its outer edge. The State could not impose examinations, but, aiding the owner class, could provide an examining board, the certificates of which would carry respect, and promote greatly the chances of employment of their holders.

How little hope is entertained by some well-informed persons that Congress will take up shipping questions in a careful way, is well exhibited in the remarks made by Senator Frye of Maine on the 5th of July, in presenting to the Senate the petition of the Board of Trade of Bath for the appointment of a commission to inquire into the decline of our shipping, and the measures which should be instituted for its revival. They are thus given in the *Record* of that date:



"I do not know where to send this paper. There is no Committee of Congress of either House that takes the slightest interest in the commercial marine of the United States. There is no head of a Department that has jurisdiction over the subject. It is an orphan, really, without any orphans' court or guardian. It is a waif without any home. It is a tramp to whom nobody is obliged to give cold victuals even. I present the memorial, but I do not know what to do with it."

THE PRESIDENT *pro tempore*—"The Chair suggests that it be referred to the Committee on Commerce."

Mr. FRYE—"The Committee on Commerce is entirely taken up with the consideration of the River and Harbor bill, I believe, in both Houses, at this time."

Mr. GARLAND—"To what subject does the memorial relate?"

THE PRESIDENT *pro tempore*—"To the commercial marine."

Mr. FRYE—"That there should be established a commission is beyond question, and the time is coming when Congress will find itself compelled absolutely to take this matter into consideration and do something with it."

To which latter sentiment we may say that we may as well be sanguine about matters which fall under the view of Congress, altho after the anti-Chinese, the Pension, and the River and Harbor bills, one does require to be optimistic to expect much of the good sense of honorable Senators and Representatives in Congress assembled. Yet the country is after all greater than Congress, and it is possible to believe that it will not always give the go-by to the various sins of omission and commission which are perpetrated by Congress in the name of law, order, and government.

I am reminded here that it is often said that money and wages are too high in our country to admit of prosperity in ocean navigation. I do not find either of these propositions true. Money is very little, if any, dearer here than in London, as is proven by the rate of interest which is paid upon our national bonds. It may be somewhat dearer for purposes of an uncertain character, than for the same purposes in England, where there is the habit of confidence, and less jugglery perhaps in the stock market. The margin for profit is a wide one, however, in navigation—so wide that a slight difference in the interest

rate would not count for much. And as to wages, with free ships, free officers, and free seamen there is no reason whatever why we should not employ commanders and crews as cheaply as others do. Our ships would go into all ports, and have the chance to get men at going rates.

I have intimated that the last-comer in navigation may possess certain advantages. I refer to the fact that steamers are being improved constantly, particularly in the cost of running. The purchaser of a new and improved vessel has thus an opportunity to compete upon unequal terms with the holders of vessels which are not of the best type, yet are too good to be condemned. It happened in this way that we entered upon steam navigation later than the English, and were in a few years ahead of them in steam tonnage, although our success was temporary.

I have said nothing about bounties, subsidies, and differential duties as means to build up the carrying-trade, and I do not propose to do so. We are suffering from the effects of well-meant legislation now, and we would suffer in one way or another from legislation in these other directions if such laws should be enacted. If, given a fair chance, Americans cannot compete in navigation, I am very much mistaken. If, in order to do so, they must be sustained by the results of general taxation, it is better that we should continue to use the ships of people who, for whatever reasons, succeed in this branch of enterprise while we fail.

GEORGE F. SEWARD.

## THE FUTURE OF TURKEY.

WHEN the diplomatists of Europe, in the year 1878, signed the treaty of Berlin, and returned to their several countries, bringing (as one of them expressed it) "peace with honor," the fond hope was entertained by many that the last had been heard of "the Eastern question" for at least a quarter of a century, and that the inquiry, "What is to be done with Turkey?" would no longer oppress Western statesmen like an incubus or a horrid dream. Guarded by the twin dragons, England and Austria, the Turkish Empire was to enjoy a season of repose, during which it was imagined that, safe from external dangers, her rulers might address themselves "to the duties of good government and the task of reform." Men spoke and wrote hopefully of "the revival of Turkey," and pictured to themselves an Ottoman Empire, no longer menaced from without, arranging and consolidating itself by efforts from within, and becoming such a model of order, justice, stability, and prosperity as would render her an example to the world. The waste places of Asia Minor and Mesopotamia were to be converted into fruitful fields; commerce was to flourish; brigandage was to cease; the leopard was to lie down with the lamb, the Koord with the Armenian, the Bedouin with the Maronite and Druse; English capital was to flow eastward; English colonies were to spread themselves over Anatolia and Syria; manufactures were to spring up, agriculture to thrive; a network of railways was to cover the land; the trade of India, deserting the line of the Red Sea and the Suez Canal, was to pass to the Mediterranean by way of the Persian Gulf and the Euphrates Valley rail; commercial routes were to be established which would carry the cottons of Manchester and the hardware of

Birmingham and Sheffield into the heart of Asia; and a renovated Turkey, in close alliance with Great Britain, was to become the worthy associate of the latter in Asiatic improvement, progress, and civilization.

The short space of four years has sufficed to dispel these illusions. The "last opportunity," as Lord Salisbury phrased it, offered to Turkey by the interposition of Europe has not been seized upon by those who guide the destinies of the empire; no sincere efforts have been made for financial or administrative reform; at Constantinople the old game of diplomatic finesse has been resumed and statesmanship regarded as consisting in playing off one power against another; there has been no invigoration of the central energy through the lopping off of extremities, no recovery of a national spirit under the pressure of calamity, no development of a new and wise policy under circumstances peculiarly calculated to call it forth; like the Bourbons, Turkey has neither "learnt anything nor unlearnt anything" by her misfortunes: she allows year after year to pass without initiating any new measures; she amuses diplomatists with talk and herself with the idea that she is necessary to Europe, and will be upheld in her present position however she conducts herself; and all the while the golden sands of time are slipping from her grasp, she is allowing her "last opportunity" to escape her—she is causing her friends to despair and her enemies to laugh in their sleeves. The statesmen of Europe are becoming more and more of one mind with respect to her—viz., that, as a European power, her part is played out; that she must suffer further disintegration, lose her outlying provinces, and contract herself towards her true centre—and thus "the Eastern question" once more looms in a not remote distance, and "the future of Turkey" again presents itself to European cabinets as among the most pressing problems of the day.

The spectacle of a great empire falling into ruins is not a pleasing tho it may be an instructive one. The vast dominions united into a single kingdom by the house of Othman in the space of about four centuries, from A.D. 1300 to A.D. 1687, extended from Istria on the upper Adriatic to the head of the Persian Gulf—a distance of thirty-five degrees, or

nearly two thousand statute miles. It embraced Istria, Croatia, Bosnia, the Herzegovina, Illyria, Montenegro, Albania, Greece, Roumelia, Servia, Bulgaria, Moldavia, Wallachia, Bessarabia, the Crimea, Mingrelia, Imeritia, Georgia, Asia Minor or Anatolia, Armenia, Kurdistan, Mesopotamia, Irak Arabi, Syria, Palestine, Egypt, Tripoli, Tunis, Algeria, and the islands of the Archipelago. Even Hungary was at one time tributary, and Austria itself was threatened by the Turkish armies, which more than once laid siege to Vienna. But the glorious rule of the Othmans and the Suleymans was followed by the degraded times of the Achmets and the Köprelis; and as early as the end of the seventh century the Turkish apogee was past and decline had manifestly set in. Istria was lost not very long after it had been gained; but the real disintegration of the empire cannot properly be regarded as having commenced until towards the middle of the eighteenth century, when first of all (1736) the sovereignty over the Crimea passed from the hands of Turkey into those of Russia, and then, by the treaty of Jassy (1792), Georgia and the neighboring districts were ceded to the same grasping adversary. Twenty years later (1812) Bessarabia followed Georgia, and Russia was enabled to plant one foot upon the Danube. Imeritia, Mingrelia, and a fair slice of Armenia were lost to the empire two years afterwards (1814) by the treaty of Gulistan. The struggle of the Greeks for independence began in 1820, and terminated after nine years of bloody contest in the establishment of the Hellenic republic under Count Capo d'Istrias (1829). The outlying dependency of Algeria was in 1830 absorbed by France. Soon afterwards Egypt, presided over by the genius of Mehemet Ali, became practically independent. The success of the Allies in the Crimean war proved no bar to the disintegrating process. By the peace of Paris Moldavia and Wallachia were united into a principality under a hereditary ruler, who has since been accepted into the European hierarchy of monarchs. The recent war with Russia led to greater losses than any former one. By the treaty of Berlin Bulgaria, Servia, and Montenegro became independent states; Greece was aggrandized by the addition of Thessaly; Russia received the greater portion of Turkish Armenia, including the port of Batoum and the fortress of Kars; while Austria was



given the Herzegovina and Bosnia, nominally to administer them for the Porte, but practically to retain them as long as it suits her convenience.

The result is that at the present time "the Ottoman flag casts a flickering and uncertain shadow over a third—hardly a third—of what once was the European dominion of Othman's sons;" while the Asiatic dominion is considerably diminished, and the African almost gone. Turkey is reduced from a first-rate to a third-rate European power, and, even if the rest of her empire be thrown into the scale, can weigh no more in the balance of nations than Italy or Spain. Her area, once above 700,000 square miles, is reduced to about 500,000; her population, once thirty-five millions, does not now much exceed twenty. She is little more than "the shadow of her former self." If it were not for her geographical position and the *prestige* of her name, few would care to inquire either into her present condition or into her probable "future."

But her geographical position is unique. It may be doubted whether the whole world offers—it is certain that the eastern hemisphere does not offer—any other position so commanding, so delightful, so thoroughly eligible. Seated still on two continents and dowered with the best lands of each, commanding three seas, the Euxine, the Sea of Marmora, and the Eastern Mediterranean, enjoying a climate neither over-dry nor over-moist and tempered between the extremes of heat and cold; lying, moreover, in the very pathway of civilization and of commerce, on the direct road between the East and the West, holding the keys of the Black Sea, of the Persian Gulf, of India, of Central Asia,—the Ottoman Empire unites a number of advantages which are elsewhere separated, and enjoys several which are altogether peculiar to itself. The soil, everywhere fertile, produces rich crops under a rude system of cultivation; vast mineral treasures, gold, silver, copper, iron, coal, lie at no great depth below the surface in numerous places; dense forests of noble trees clothe the mountain-sides; water is plentiful; streams of large volume abound; and an indented coast offers facilities to navigation and commerce. What Herodotus says of the climate of his beloved Ionia is applicable to the adjoining districts, and, with some modification, to the whole empire:



"No other region in the whole world is equally blest." Every province of Turkey is desirable, and is desired, some of them with passionate cravings, by more than one of her neighbors.

And her capital! Ever since the days when Megabazus the Persian taxed the Chalcedonians with blindness for having overlooked the capabilities of the site, its excellence has been the theme of countless historians and geographers. "The Byzantines," says the sagacious Polybius, "occupy a position which is, of all others in the whole world known to us, the most secure and the most blissful. For it lies so close upon the mouth of the Euxine Sea that it is impossible for any merchant vessel either to sail in or sail out of the sea without the Byzantines' permission; and as the Euxine produces a multitude of commodities which are useful to mankind at large, the Byzantines have the complete command of all these. For, with respect to the necessities of life, it is confessed that the Euxine regions yield the most plentiful and excellent supply that is anywhere to be had, alike of cattle and of slaves; and in the matter of superfluities they furnish in abundance honey and wax, and salted fish. Moreover, they readily receive from us both oil and all sorts of wines. In corn they deal both ways: sometimes they opportunely export it to us, at other times they import it from us." The calm and unenthusiastic Gibbon, after a long description of the site, thus sums up its merits: "We are at present qualified to view the advantageous position of Constantinople, which appears to have been formed by nature for the centre and capital of a great monarchy. Situated in the forty-first degree of latitude, the imperial city commanded, from her seven hills, the opposite shores of Europe and Asia; the climate was healthy and temperate, the soil fertile, the harbor secure and capacious; and the approach on the side of the continent was of small extent and easy defence. The Bosphorus and the Hellespont may be considered as the two gates of Constantinople; and the prince who possessed those important passages could always shut them against a naval enemy and open them to the fleets of commerce. . . . When the gates of the Hellespont and Bosphorus were shut, the capital still enjoyed, within their spacious inclosure, every production which could supply the wants or gratify the luxury of its numerous in-

habitants. The sea-coasts of Thrace and Bithynia, which languish under the weight of Turkish oppression, still exhibit a rich prospect of vineyards, of gardens, and of plentiful harvests; and the Propontis has ever been renowned for an inexhaustible store of the most exquisite fish, that are taken in their stated seasons without skill and almost without labor. But when the passages of the Straits were thrown open for trade, they alternately admitted the natural and artificial riches of the north and south, of the Euxine and the Mediterranean. Whatever rude commodities were collected in the forests of Germany and Scythia, as far as the sources of the Tanais and the Borysthenes; whatsoever was manufactured by the skill of Europe or Asia; the corn of Egypt and the gems and spices of the furthest India,—were brought by the varying winds into the port of Constantinople, which for many ages attracted the commerce of the ancient world. The prospect of beauty, of safety, and of wealth, united in a single spot, was sufficient to justify the choice of Constantine.” We need only add that the recent improvements in the science of military defence, the inventions of rifled guns of enormous calibre, of iron plating for forts, and of torpedoes, have added greatly to the security of a capital previously the most secure from attack of any in the world.

It would little matter what amount of temptation the cities or provinces of Turkey offered to the other nations of Europe if she herself possessed the ordinary vigor and energy of a state of her dimensions, or could be trusted to put forth her full natural strength if attacked, whether by a single enemy or a combination. But the circumstances of her present situation are such as to render her almost powerless to act; she is like a man suffering from creeping paralysis, the sources of whose life are being withered up; her weakness tempts assault; and already Europe contemplates the probability of her breaking up, and forecasts the disposition which is to be made of her fragments.

No doubt there is considerable truth in the saying that “threatened men live long;” and in the present instance the “Sick Man” has so often recovered that we must not be surprised if many persons are still incredulous of the near approach of the end. Far be it from us to fix the coming break-

up to a year or a decade of years. There are a thousand unforeseen contingencies which may cause events to move more or less quickly. The day may arrive shortly, or it may be deferred. But it is scarcely conceivable that the present generation will not see, at any rate, "*le commencement de la fin.*"

For the weakness from which Turkey suffers is of that complicated kind from which the patient does not recover but by a miracle. In the first place, she labors under the disadvantage of being geographically weak, owing to her extension, and the awkward circumstance of her capital being situated too near one of her extremities. While so many both of her southern and her northern provinces have fallen away from her, she still stretches a distance of above 1700 miles from east to west, and thus occupies a strip of territory five or six times as long as it is broad. Constantinople, which was sufficiently central for practical purposes when her European provinces fairly balanced her Asiatic ones, is now too far from the main sources of her strength, which lie in Asia Minor, Syria, and upper Mesopotamia. Nothing could remedy these defects but a large contraction of her Asiatic or a large extension of her European dominion; the former of these is very unlikely, while the latter may be pronounced impossible.

A second and very important source of weakness is to be found in the number of the subject races included within her dominions, and their intense hostility, for the most part, to their conquerors. Slavs, Greeks, Albanians, and Bulgarians in Europe; Greeks, Armenians, Koords, Druses, Maronites, Syrians, Chaldeans, Yezidis, and a host of minor tribes in Asia, occupy almost one half of the soil and form a full half of the population. Of these there are a few, as the Albanians, the Koords, and perhaps the native Syrians, who, hating other races more, have with the Turks a certain amount of sympathy; but the large majority of these aliens, holding their conquerors in utter detestation, desire nothing so much as that their weakness should increase, and compel them to grant to all the tribes within their borders full autonomy. In Europe aspirations after independence, long cherished in secret, have been encouraged and quickened into vigorous life by the examples of successful revolt which are seen on every side. An independent Montene-

gro, a free Servia, a free Bulgaria, an enlarged kingdom of Greece, preach to all the subjected races within the narrowed limits of the existing empire discontent with their condition and the hope of bettering it by rebellion. Turkey has never succeeded in amalgamating with her own any single conquered nationality, has never even known how to conciliate the affections or win the regard of one alien race. She has set her heel upon the vanquished and made them groan under its pressure. A coarse and brutal disregard of their feelings, an openly expressed contempt, a habit of adding insult to injury by accompanying oppression and exaction with terms of contumely and abuse, has secured her the ill-will of every subject-people that has felt her gripe, and caused that ill-will to assume in most cases the character of bitter and intense animosity. Turkey can look for no help in her hours of danger from the non-Turkish races who encumber her soil, and equal her own sons in number. Already Arabs in the far south, Koords in the extreme east, Bulgarians, Slavs, and Greeks in the west, have risen in arms and severely shaken her authority. As the pulse of life grows feebler in its central citadel we may expect to see frequent repetitions and imitations of the Koordish ravages of 1880, the Arab troubles of the same year, and the Roumelian and Macedonian disturbances, which are chronic and seem to be increasing.

Again, Turkey is weak through the defects of her governmental system. A government by pashas, especially by pashas removable at pleasure, is inherently vicious, and of necessity exhausts a country and brings it into peril. Men who have absolute power over a large territory for a term, the duration of which is uncertain, will as a matter of course begin their career with severe and rigorous exactions; since they have to "make hay while the sun shines," and, if possible, accumulate a fortune before the intrigues of a court or the caprice of a despot brings about their downfall. The evils of the Roman proconsular system, made world-famous through Cicero's prosecution of Verres, are intensified when the governor does not even know that he will hold office for a year, and must therefore use every effort to fill his pockets as soon as possible. The inherent vices of satrapial government are thus very great; but they are ac-

centuated by various features of the Turkish practice which, tho no necessary parts of the system, are unfortunately established and, as it would seem, ineradicable. The Turkish official purchases his appointment by flinging bribes broadcast among ministers and secretaries, eunuchs and harem favorites, at Constantinople, and must make a good round sum out of his province even to recoup himself for this outlay. Moreover, he is expected to pay at least half his first year's income to the special patron who obtained him his appointment; and if he looks to hold his pashalik for any considerable term he must be prepared to keep up his interest at the court by the continual remittance of "refreshers," without which the memories of his friends would be apt to prove exceedingly treacherous. Further, his official stipend is in no case so much as five hundred pounds a year, and for the most part is less than two hundred; out of which he has to pay the expenses of a large suite, besides furnishing the *douceurs* above mentioned. Under these circumstances it is scarcely in human nature—it is certainly not in Turkish nature—to play the purist and abstain from dipping his hands into the pockets of those who are entirely at his mercy. His two main duties are the administration of justice and the collection of the revenue, both of them lucrative employments. It is his aim to exact from the provincials, with whom he has no sympathies, as large a sum as they can possibly be made to pay under the head of taxes, and then to keep back as large a portion of what is paid him as he can anyhow dare and convert it to his own private benefit. Justice he openly sells to the highest bidder; or, if the sense of shame has not wholly left him, arranges with an underling to transact the business on his behalf, under a veil—not, however, a very thick veil—of secrecy. If he is a really clever man and manages his opportunities well, he may make a very tolerable fortune in the course of a few years; and when he leaves his province stripped of its last penny and returns to Constantinople, he may be able to bribe his way to a Secretaryship or a Grand Vizierate.

Two causes especially render it next to impossible that there should be any recovery from this state of things, any thorough searching reform of the existing system. One of these is the financial exhaustion that prevails. To put an end to the exac-



tions whereby the provinces are ruined, and substitute good government for the downright oppression that is now everywhere rampant, it would be necessary to appoint each governor for a term, say, of five years, and to guarantee him a stipend of two or three thousand a year. He should further have at his disposal a considerable sum—not less than half of that raised by taxation in his province—for the relief of distress within his government, the encouragement of agriculture, and the construction of roads and other public works. An honest and energetic pasha, adequately paid, and able to initiate improvements in agricultural processes and the means of communication without involving himself in certain ruin, might in a short time work such a transformation in any province as the most sanguine could now scarcely picture.

The capabilities of the soil are everywhere immense; and a little security, a little encouragement, the stretching out here and there of a helping hand, together with the stoppage of the present crushing exactions, would produce a revival to gladden the heart of a philanthropist. But however desirable all this may be, and however clearly it may be seen to be desirable by the wiser among Turkish statesmen, they are forced to dismiss it from their thoughts as a wild and impossible dream, from the existing financial embarrassments. The reckless extravagance of the court during the last thirty years and the necessary expenses of the late war have emptied the exchequer; the loss of provinces has reduced the revenues; the troubles in Irak Arabi, Eastern Armenia, and Macedonia have prevented the taxes from being gathered in. Meanwhile the outgoings have been large. The attitude of Greece and Albania in Europe, and of France in Africa, have been thought to require that the army should be maintained at a high figure. Tho the normal practice is to leave the soldiers' pay some years in arrear, yet troops must be fed, and something must be occasionally paid them on account, or they may become dangerous. Accordingly the military outlay, even since the war was at an end, has been exceptionally large. Nor has there been any serious reduction in the civil expenditure. The sultan's "privy purse" absorbs as much as ever. The high-placed civil servants continue to draw their



enormous salaries. Unnecessary embassies and commissions drain away the little that is left. Meanwhile the bondholders, whose capital has created the Turkish navy and a score of gorgeous palaces, instead of interest for their money receive from time to time a renewal of paper promises, such as the recent *Iradé* of a year ago; and Russia, the master-creditor, whose war-indemnity of a hundred and fifty millions is acknowledged as a just debt, receives not a stiver. If not actually bankrupt, Turkey is absolutely impecunious: she lives from hand to mouth; the salaries of her minor officials are everywhere in arrear; she has no fund, no stock, no hoard upon which to inaugurate a new system, such as might arrest her fall or even restore her prosperity.

It may be asked, "Can she not borrow?" The capitalists of Europe reply, "No. You borrowed recklessly for thirty years. You wasted the sums advanced to you. You have now for some nine or ten years suspended the payment of interest upon your loans. And you have the face to 'ask for more.' You expect that we will throw good money after bad. You are mistaken. You will get nothing from us; not a guinea—not a cent."

The money difficulty is therefore insuperable; but even if it could be overcome, there is another which would be a fatal bar to the proposed reform of the provincial administration. For the establishment of such a reform as we have sketched there must be placed in each province, as we have already stated, "an energetic and honest pasha." A score or two of such persons must be found and sent to their posts, where they would be "the right men in the right places." It seems a light enough requirement. But we fear it is one with which the conditions of her present existence would not allow Turkey to comply. The men are not there. A Turkish Diogenes might go about with a lantern and seek them for years without finding them. As long ago as the Crimean war it was admitted to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe by the Ottoman ministers that they did not know where to lay their hands on a public servant who united high capacity with honesty. And the character of Turkish officials has certainly not improved since then. It

is a stanch friend of the Ottoman power who has not long since observed:

"Every patron, every dispenser of good things, every great man, every minister—the sultan himself—one and all, have written up over their doors, not in letters of ink or gold, but in the yet more legible characters of unspoken, universal, *irreversible* custom, 'To be bought.' Hither come the suitors, a countless throng—for 'place-seeking grows in a nation as public spirit decays—and the Turks, of all men once the freest from this vice, are now the most widely tainted with it; a *hopelessly* degraded throng too; for 'take a turn and mend' who may, it will not be he who has once, in eastern phrase, 'sold the skin of his face;' *i.e.*, bartered away the blush of shame for office-hunting, little likely ever to brace himself up again to the independence of honest work, or even of honest idleness. The purchase is effected, and the purchaser's next care is to make the most of his business by the retail sale of what he himself has bought wholesale through every grade and function of his administration. Thus Stamboul is parodied in the 'Konak' of every province, with this difference only, that the former plunders only to retain, while the latter retains indeed some part, but remits more. 'Omnia cum pretio' might be affirmed of modern official Turkey more truly even than ever it was of imperial Rome."

Still, a building that seems tottering to its fall may stand for a considerable space of time, if it is left alone. The crash only comes when the ruin is meddled with. Is there then any fair prospect of Turkey being left alone? Or does not the meddling process threaten her? Nay, has it not already begun?

On the seaboard of Northern Africa Turkey once possessed four provinces—Algeria, Tunis, Tripoli, and Egypt. Algeria had an area of 160,000 square miles, and a population of two millions; Tunis a million inhabitants, and an area about half that of Algeria; the territory of Tripoli exceeded that of Algeria and Tunis added together, but her population was only about a million and a half; Egypt with a territorial extent considerably less boasted a population not far short of six millions. It is now a little more than half a century since France cast a covetous eye towards the southern Mediterranean shores, and contriving to pick a quarrel with Turkey's vassal, the Dey of Algiers, invaded and annexed his territory. The acquisition did not prove of much value, and French statesmen of all schools viewed till recently the precedent of 1830 as a beacon to be avoided rather than as an example to be followed. But in

1881, suddenly, to the surprise of all Europe, the disgust of Italy, the alarm of Turkey, and the dislike if not the formal disapproval of England, a second African expedition was undertaken by the French Government, and a military occupation of Tunis effected under the pretence of chastising border raids. The result is that Turkey has lost a second African province—lost it, moreover, in a time of peace, without any declaration of hostilities; and, to her great discredit, has put up with the loss without other resistance than the circulation of a feeble diplomatic protest. She has thus made the most fatal confession of weakness that can be conceived, by proclaiming to all the world that she is wronged without making the slightest effort to withstand the wrongdoer. The exact form into which the Tunisian *imbroglio* will ultimately settle itself is still highly doubtful, but if anything is certain it is that Turkey's part in Tunisian affairs is played out, and that henceforth she will be as completely excluded from Tunis as from Algeria.

But the peril to Turkey does not end here. Tripoli borders on Tunis; and exactly the same pleas which have been urged to justify the Tunisian occupation of 1881 may be repeated three years hence to justify a seizure of Tripoli. The weakness of the Porte must be regarded as a constant factor in the equation, and active resistance to French aggression is no more to be expected in 1885 than in 1881. Events have an inherent power to draw on the persons engaged in them to action not originally intended or even contemplated; and the logic of facts is likely to be too strong for those who would draw a line at the eastern extremity of the Gulf of Cades, and say to France, "Thus far shalt thou go, and no farther." To those familiar with the concatenation of historic movements, to wise statesmen generally, and diplomats in particular, the advance of France into Tripoli is next door to a *fait accompli*—it is the inevitable sequence of the Tunisian occupation of 1881.

There is another power, quite as much to be dreaded as France, which bides her time, but which is, not unreasonably, credited with views and designs even more inimical to the continuance of the existing Ottoman state than those of French filibusters. This is Austria, whom the treaty of Berlin has placed in the new position of probable heir to the "Sick Man's"

European estates, when his long illness terminates in dissolution. By the advance of her frontier to the southeast, and her establishment at Novi-bazaar, Austria has been brought nearer to Constantinople than any other of the great European powers. She is thrust in between Bulgaria and Servia on the one hand, Albania and Northern Roumelia upon the other; with her solid settled institutions and her tried military strength, she is put in contact with a mass of disorganized and fermenting elements—mixed, rude, half-developed nationalities—all of them ripe for change and ready to adopt almost any change as preferable to their present condition. Circumstances present her as a rallying point to all the disaffected; and her own ambition prompts her to push the advantage which circumstances give her to the utmost. She has long desired access to the Archipelago, and now sees herself within half a dozen marches of the town and gulf of Saloniki. Already her emissaries are, it is said, on the move, and paving the way for her advance into Western Roumelia by fomenting the discontent of the tribes, and bribing Greeks and Slavs to transfer their ecclesiastical allegiance from the so-called "Orthodox Church" to the Roman communion. When a sufficient number of converts have been made it will be easy for her to excite troubles, disorders, even insurrections. Then, at last, Turkey being powerless to suppress such disturbances, she will step in as the "saviour of society"—the only power upon the spot strong enough to put down anarchy, and restore peace and tranquillity to the fair regions intervening between the eastern Mediterranean and the southern slopes of the Balkans.

Nor is it to be supposed that Russia has abandoned the policy of centuries, or made up her mind to desist from those schemes of aggrandizing herself at the expense of Turkey which were laid bare, with so much simplicity, not to say cynicism, by the late Czar Nicholas to Sir Hamilton Seymour. It may be that she sees the vanity of that delusive dream, so long cherished, so nearly made a reality in 1878, but frustrated at the moment of its seeming accomplishment—the enthronement of Muscovite power on the Golden Horn. But assuredly she has not relinquished the idea of obtaining a slice, larger or smaller, of the "Sick Man's" territories, if any general collapse occurs, or

even any serious retrocession of the Turkish power from its present limits. The quarter in which she probably, under present circumstances, looks for gains is that immediately within Turkey's north-eastern frontier, where the preponderance of Armenians and Koords over Turks is favorable to that system of intrigue, leading to interference, whereby her advances hitherto have been mostly made. It is true that England has guaranteed the Asiatic dominion of Turkey; but advantage would probably be taken of a time when the English nation, disgusted with the non-fulfilment of Ottoman promises of reform, was in no mood to assist in supporting her recalcitrant *protégé*, and could hold herself absolved from her obligations by Turkey's failure to make good her pledges. Russia might annex a considerable tract in this quarter without wounding English susceptibilities, and, by proclaiming herself the champion of the oppressed Armenians, might be certain of obtaining among British politicians a good deal of support and sympathy. British interests are not directly concerned in Armenia or Northern Kurdistan, and the British lion would probably take very quietly the advance of the Russian frontier to Lake Van and the upper Tigris.

It might be, however, that, in the event of a French occupation of Tripoli, an Austrian descent upon Serres and Saloniki, and a Russian advance to the line of the Tigris, British statesmen would think it necessary to maintain the balance of power by strengthening England's position in the eastern Mediterranean. It is generally recognized that the occupation of Cyprus has done little or nothing for the furtherance of British interests in that important region. Some further movement, some occupation of a portion of the mainland, might be deemed obligatory for that absolute security of her communications with India which is a necessity of England's existence. In this case, it is scarcely doubtful that the needed counterpoise would be sought in Egypt, where the establishment of a British protectorate would be, diplomatically, quite as defensible as the setting up of French protectorates in Tunis and Tripoli. So long as the *status quo* is maintained it is undoubtedly true to say that England does not covet Egypt. Her interests are far better served by a weak but friendly power being in possession of the country



and undertaking its administration, than they would be if she had to burthen herself with the responsibility of a new dependency, laden with a heavy debt, which she could not in honor repudiate, and inhabited by a population which, both in ancient and in modern times, has shown itself difficult to manage. She therefore desires no change; but if changes come—if Austria, and Germany through Austria, plants herself on the coast of Thrace; if France, by absorbing Tripoli, stretches her African sovereignty to the Egyptian frontier; if Russia, by annexing Turkish Armenia and Kurdistan, dominates the possible line to India of the Euphrates valley and the Persian Gulf—then England will have to review her whole position and determine on her course. It *may* be judged necessary that she should occupy, at any rate, lower Egypt. She would probably be able to obtain the assent of the Porte to her so doing. Egypt, it is to be presumed, would acquiesce, and the Nile would pass under British rule and become a tributary of the Thames.

The main difficulty in this arrangement is the complication which might ensue with France. Ever since the expedition of the first Napoleon in 1798, France has claimed a special interest in Egypt, and has exhibited a jealousy towards any power which threatened to eclipse her influence. She has sought to strengthen her position by a lavish pecuniary outlay; and the capital which she has invested in Egyptian enterprises is so large that it gives her certainly a claim to special consideration. But sentimental and monetary considerations must yield to political exigencies; and if the conjunction of circumstances which we have supposed arises, France may well be called upon by England to recognize that England's interests in Egypt immeasurably transcend hers, and require that hers should be postponed to theirs. In any settlement her pecuniary interests would, of course, be safeguarded. All that diplomacy would have to do would be to minimize the offence to her *amour propre*, and to arrange such compensation as might be feasible for her loss of *prestige* or political status. It ought not to be very difficult for two friendly states, such as England and France, to come to such an agreement on this point as might be satisfactory to both parties.



The *great* difficulty will probably arise later. What is to be done with Constantinople? With Austria established in Western Roumelia upon the Strumnitza and the Vardar, Albania would be lost to Turkey, and would probably become, like Montenegro, an independent principality. Turkey's European dominions would then be reduced to the eastern half of Roumelia—the valley of the Maritza, and the tract extending thence to the Sea of Marmora and the Euxine. Would it be worth her while to retain this corner of Europe? Might it not be well that she should escape from European obligations and entanglements, by withdrawing into Asia, and establishing her capital at Brusa, Kaisariyeh, or Aleppo? Would not the fixing of her metropolis in a more central position than that of Stamboul be an immense advantage to her, and enable her to consolidate her Asiatic dominion in a way that can never be done from the European side of the Straits? All her traditions point to a time when she is to retire from Europe, and to be once more Asiatic only, as in the palmy days of Othman the Great. In Europe she has never been more than “encamped.” If, with the consent of Europe, she were to cede Constantinople to a European power—or, still better, to make it over to a European congress—she might count on a pecuniary compensation which would put an end to her financial embarrassments.

Of European powers there are three which might conceivably be allowed by the majority of an European congress to establish themselves upon the Golden Horn—Russia, Austria, England. The main objection to placing Russia there is the narrowness and stringency of her commercial system. It is not to be expected that England would ever consent to place the keys of the Black Sea in the hands of a state notoriously bent on locking every door which she gets into her power against all commerce but her own. Public opinion in England would not allow any government to acquiesce in such an arrangement; and the congress which so decreed would simply kindle an internecine war between England and Russia. It is in the highest degree improbable that any congress would so act. Might then England aspire to add Constantinople to her other Mediterranean possessions, Gibraltar, Malta, Cyprus? On principle, there would seem to be no objection to such an arrangement, if

it were accompanied by a guarantee that the Straits should always be open to the trading vessels of all nations. England is pledged to free trade, and desires to shut her rivals out of no markets; all that she wants is "a fair field and no favor." The Dardanelles and Bosphorus might be placed in her hands without any danger of her wishing to interfere with commerce in time of peace; and she might bind herself to be equally complaisant in time of war. But it is not unlikely that Russia would strenuously object, and make it a condition of not pressing her own claims that England's candidature should also be disallowed. We must not expect magnanimity in nations. To see the power which stepped in and saved Constantinople from her grasp in 1878, when her hand was outstretched to seize, installed there in her stead, might be too bitter a pill for so proud a nation as Russia to swallow, and she might probably refuse her consent. In that case, some other solution of the problem would have to be sought; and not many present themselves.

It has been suggested that the city should be made over to Greece, either with or without Roumelia. To this the primary objection is that Greece is too weak. Constantinople, whether held by Turkey or not, will remain a Mahometan city, with a large and turbulent population, requiring a strong and firm hand to rule it. To install Greece as mistress would be to provoke insurrection, and pave the way for a general massacre of the Christians. No people can easily endure to be placed under the yoke of those who but now were their slaves. And Greece has shown no such administrative ability hitherto as would justify the entrusting to her of a delicate and difficult task—one requiring tact and a conciliatory temper, combined with energy and firmness. Greece cannot be counted on for either the *main de fer* or the *gant de velours* that are requisite.

Another suggestion that has been thrown out is that Constantinople should become, like Hamburg and Bremen, a "free city." But the experiment of a free *Mahometan* city has never been tried, and it is quite uncertain what the result would be. "Free towns" are for races accustomed to free institutions and strongly attached to the principles of order and security. A self-governed Constantinople might soon be a Constantinople without any government at all—a city under mob law, swept

by gusts of passion, fanaticism, and panic fear. Europe cannot consent to establish in such a position an element of continual disturbance and danger.

It remains that Austria should be installed in the coveted position, the Straits being at the same time neutralized. Austria is liberal in her commercial policy, unaggressive, yet sufficiently strong. Her establishment on the Golden Horn would safeguard German interests in respect of the Danube, would secure the tranquillity of Roumelia, and cause little or no jealousy anywhere. She can be suspected of no Asiatic designs, and having reached the Bosphorus would have reached the final eastern limit of her dominion. Whether Bulgaria and Servia would gravitate to her, or to Roumania, might be doubtful, but even in the former case she would gain no such accession of strength as would seriously disturb the existing balance of power. She would remain a congeries of heterogeneous elements, held together by an administrative system, originally well devised, and perfected by long experience—a type of empire which can never be so strong as to imperil others.

It remains to consider what would be the result to Turkey of these changes. Geographically Turkey would be transformed from a scattered and straggling state, with a capital towards one extremity, into a compact country, with, if she chose, a central metropolis, equally accessible to all the border provinces, and secure from foreign attack except as the result of a regularly organized invasion. Her territory would be reduced from an area of 500,000 square miles to one of about 400,000, or a tract twice as large as France and more than three times the size of Italy. It would comprise Anatolia, with all its varied beauties and riches, vegetable and mineral; Syria, with its fertile soil and its undying memories; Mesopotamia, the possession of which enabled Assyria to build up the first great oriental empire; and Irak Arabi, or Babylonia, the natural granary of Western Asia, and the cradle of oriental civilization. It would abut upon three seas—the Black Sea, the eastern Mediterranean, and the Persian Gulf, and so possess facilities for an extensive commerce. It would have famous ports upon these seas—Trebizond, Samsoun, Sinopé, Smyrna, Beyrout, Bassorah—it would communicate with them by navigable rivers—the Tigris,

the Euphrates, the Kodús, the Mendere, the Sakkariyeh, the Kizil Irmak, and others—and it would be able without much difficulty to supplement these lines of communication by railways. A line from Selefkiyeh at the mouth of the Orontes, by way of Aleppo and the Euphrates to the Persian Gulf, which is wholly without engineering difficulties, would divert from the Suez route the whole passenger traffic with India, were it once constructed.

Politically Turkey would be freed in a great measure from European entanglements, and enabled to devote her main energies to the consolidation of her power and the development of her resources. She would be changed from a congeries of heterogeneous elements into a community mainly homogeneous, tho no doubt still to some extent mixed. Her Turkish subjects, including all varieties, would amount to eleven millions; of Koords she would rule over about a million; of Armenians, say half a million; of Druses, Ansairiyeh, Yezidis, Kizil-Bashis, and other minor sects, a million; of Greeks, a million; of Syrians, about the same number; of Arabs, half a million; and of Jews, Maronites, Chaldeans, Nabathæans, Circassian refugees, etc., a full million—in all seventeen millions, whereof nearly two thirds would be Turks. Her religious unity would be promoted, since fourteen millions out of the seventeen would be professors of Islam, and only three millions adherents of other creeds. Her task of preserving order and contentment among her subject populations would be immensely lightened, since she would no longer have to do with alien masses, in direct contact with European thought and fermenting with the leaven of progressive, not to say revolutionary, opinions; but with the inert and sluggish spirit of Asiatic tribes and sects, with races that have no aspirations, and, so they are not oppressed, are content to stagnate. The Greeks of Asia Minor might cause her a certain amount of trouble; but they are too scattered to be powerful, and too intent on commercial pursuits to have much time or thought for political enterprises. The Armenians that remained to her would also be scattered and weak; while Koords and Arabs, Yezidis and Chaldeans, Syrians and Ansairiyeh, Druses and Maronites, long accustomed to Turkish rule and averse to all change, would submit in the future, as in the past; or, if un-

quiet, might be more readily controlled from an Asiatic than from a European centre, from Kaisariyeh or Aleppo than from Constantinople. It is conceivable that the Turkish Government, if relieved from the incubus of its European position and thrown upon Asia, might set itself vigorously to work, and prove a principle of order, of cohesion, and even of progress, to the backward races of Karamania and Syria, of Mesopotamia and Kurdistan.

At the worst, Turkey, confined within the limits of Asia, if she did but little good, could do but little harm. For centuries she has been employed in keeping down the aspirations of nobler races and higher civilizations than her own, in oppressing subject-peoples, crippling commerce, destroying agriculture, allowing roads and bridges to go to ruin, discouraging industry, and fostering brigandage. She has made it to be generally felt that in Europe, at the present day, she is an anachronism; she belongs to the dark ages; she is a piece of mediæval history that has somehow got out of place, and intruded itself into the nineteenth century. Europe is abhorrent of her; Europe will not tolerate her system; Europe has given her notice to quit by the treaty of Berlin; and she has only now to retire from the stage as gracefully as she may. But in Asia she will find herself at home. She will not be obliged to crush aspirations, for they do not exist, or to repress rising nationalities, for they nowhere show themselves. Agriculture cannot sink under her influence, for it has reached the "lowest deep" already; roads and bridges cannot decay, for there are none; commercial enterprise cannot be discouraged, for commercial enterprise, since the days of the Phœnicians, has not been a product of Asiatic soil. All is so dead, so inert, so stagnant in Western Asia, that there is nothing to repress, nothing to crush, nothing to keep down. Turkish statesmen, finding their usual "occupation gone," will have to devise another, and may conceivably, by way of a change, set themselves to wake to life the dormant energies of that once famous region. Should such a change come over them, then indeed a day of hope might arise for Asia. The natural capabilities of the region are so great, its soil so fertile, its vegetable and mineral products so varied and precious, its peasantry so



hard-working, so temperate, and so patient, that a moderately good government might be expected to change the whole aspect of things over the entire territory. Instead of ruined bridges and caravanserais, embankments, reservoirs, and irrigation channels gone to decay, roads no longer traceable, fields without crops, and pastures without flocks, such as now meet the eye everywhere in Anatolia, Syria, and Mesopotamia, there might soon be seen once more, as in olden times, well-worn highways, bridges repaired and perfected, caravansaries rebuilt, fields cleared of weeds and briars and smiling under plentiful harvests, pastures dotted with cows, sheep, oxen, and goats, a water supply carefully husbanded and distributed, with the result of extended cultivation and enormously increased fertility, new homesteads on all sides springing up, defunct villages creeping back to life, a busy town population, a well-fed and contented peasantry, a general air of industry, cheerfulness, and prosperous ease. Nature is so lavish in Asia that the neglect of centuries may be redeemed by the wise carefulness of a few years. No effort but meets with a prompt response; no outlay but brings a quick and ample return. Nor would Turkey, if she showed the disposition to help herself, be left without help from others. Capital does not so much fly her because she is in debt, as because it has hitherto seemed hopeless that she should mend her ways. Once let her show a determination to cast off the various cankers that have eaten into her vitals, to develop her resources, assist her producing classes, encourage her industries, instead of burying the sums she borrows in iron-clads and palaces—and she may count on the assistance of England, at any rate, towards accomplishing these praiseworthy ends. England can never cease to be interested in a power which commands that alternative line of communication with India which is likely ultimately to prove the best for most purposes. England has no intention of allowing any more of her money to be sunk in Ottoman extravagances; but she would forward and assist any well-considered plan for maintaining a prosperous Turkey in the region between the Mediterranean and the Persian Gulf. Under existing conditions it is probably vain to expect any sincere adoption by Turkey of a new policy; but the time may come—and sooner than is generally antici-

pated—when, curtailed in extent, chastened by misfortune, and forced to adopt a new and untried course, she will seek the co-operation of England in the task of regenerating her Asiatic empire. We believe that such co-operation, if sought, will not be withheld. England will rejoice to take part in a movement whose object shall be to confer the blessings of order, justice, stability, and prosperity on the fairest regions of the western Asiatic world.

GEORGE RAWLINSON.

## THE DOCTRINE OF THE TRINITY IN THE LIGHT OF RECENT PSYCHOLOGY.

AN old philosopher is credited with the profound observation that the true knowledge of the one original of all things, the one God of all, is the end of all speculation—*τέλος πάσης θεώριας*. Most true it is that the intelligence of man is characteristically soaring and can never find rest till it reaches the very highest object of knowledge—the God over all. Equally true is it, on the other hand, that, by reason of the essential unity of all truth, no department of truth, no particular object of knowledge, can be fully understood except as it is contemplated in the light of the source of all truth and of all being. The truth of God is thus at once the ground and the crown of all true science and philosophy, its centre and its circumference. The famous teaching of Malebranche “that we see all things in God,” however faulty its exposition and advocacy, enfolds a truth most profound and wide-reaching and as vital to true philosophy as to practical piety. There is reason to suspect that the agnosticism of recent times has its root not in reverence, nor yet in philosophic candor, but rather in devotion to system and scientific dogma. The infinity of God is, indeed, beyond all human comprehension; to deny this is a contradiction in terms. It is yet equally sound philosophy as true orthodoxy in religion to hold, on the one hand, that the Almighty cannot be found out in his absolute perfection, that his greatness is unsearchable in its true boundlessness; and to maintain, on the other hand, that to know the only true God is the very life of man, whether as a mere intelligence or as a believer; and the degree of attainment in that knowledge measures the spirit’s growth both in philosophy and in piety. No

duty is more imperative than the duty to know God: to know that he is, and what he is. Neither reason nor revelation forbids or in any way discourages the reverent and docile study of any of the manifestations of God. His counsels finite wisdom may not be able to fathom, and there are secret things which belong to the Lord; but after all, what is revealed is authoritatively declared to belong to his people forever. It savors more of superstition than of true piety to decry reverent studies of the works and ways of God, so far as manifested to men, on the ground that they are in any sense mysterious. So far as properly mysterious—that is, really secret—they are beyond the reach of rational investigation. So far as revealed they are not mysterious, and are therefore legitimate subjects of contemplation and thought.

We certainly cannot adopt the line that separates the works of God in nature and providence from his attributes and character as the determining line between that which is the legitimate subject of our study and that which is not. We are expressly taught, indeed, that these essential attributes, those which cannot be apprehended by the outward sense, but only by the rational intelligence—"the invisible things of him," "even his eternal power and Godhead"—are discerned and understood from his works, "the things that are made."

Nor is the reverent study of the divine to be discouraged on the pretence of its being necessarily a vain and fruitless study, leading at best only to error and self-conceit, because all human knowledge is and must be anthropomorphic. There is a fatal paralogism lurking in this oracular imputation of anthropomorphism on all attempted knowledge of God. If it imply simply that our knowledge of God must be according to the laws and conditions of human thought—in other words, according to the nature and conditions of our knowing spirits—it is clearly a most harmless truism: verily, we can know only as we are made to know. Anthropomorphic knowledge is, in this sense, legitimate knowledge—true and worthy knowledge. But under this bald truism there seems to be concealed the implication that, altho we may have in a legitimate use of our knowing powers what we may call a true knowledge, still the objects which we profess to know may be widely different in

themselves from what we esteem them to be—may be essentially different as known to God. But this is a downright impeachment of the honesty and truthfulness of the Creator, charging him with giving us lying faculties and impostures for realities. It is, in fact, sheer pyrrhonism that strikes at the possibility of knowledge to man—that either denies man's claim to be a knowing being or insists that all outer objects which present themselves to his intelligence are cheats and illusions. No one in reason can maintain on any *a priori* ground either that God cannot reveal himself—that is, cannot make himself knowable, *γνωστόν* as the apostle has it—or that man's knowing nature is such as to be incapable of knowing him as thus revealed. Sir William Hamilton himself concedes everything when he avows that "we know God according to the finitude of our faculties;" and, moreover, his famous teaching that the Infinite One cannot be known by the finite mind of man has been most abundantly shown to be a gross paralogism both in form and in substance.

Inasmuch, then, as what is revealed to us of God may be known in the only true and worthy sense of what it is to know, rightly conducted speculation—that is, rational contemplation and reflection pursued in a reverent spirit, on the actual manifestations of the divine existence and character—is at once our highest privilege and our highest duty, because it gives us the knowledge which more than that of all outer things vitally concerns us.

There are two ways in which it is possible for God to make himself known to us: by the manifestation of himself through his works and ways, and by his own declarations concerning himself—through nature and providence and through verbal revelation. In the latter he expressly declares that he is a spirit, and this declaration will be found to be reiterated in the former—in the universe about us as it is constituted and as it moves or changes.

What, then, is a spirit in its essential characteristics? What are the attributes which, as essential in the very notion of God as a spirit, we must ascribe to him, and which in all reverent thinking of him we should have in our thought?



## SUMMARY OF PSYCHOLOGICAL TEACHINGS.

It will expedite our undertaking if we here in a very summary way, and in a series of distinct propositions, present the teachings of psychological science, now, it is believed, established beyond reasonable controversy, so far as they bear upon our present object.

I. Rational spirit is essentially activity—a power, a cause.

II. As active it implies an object, every exercise being an interaction between agent or subject and object. The rational spirit thus in every exercise is both active and passive.

III. The activity of the rational spirit is in three different forms or modes. The spirit has, in other words, three distinct functions which may with equal propriety be designated, either from the spirit itself—the subject or agent—or from the object which its action respects. These functions are: (1) The Intelligence, which, regarded on the active or subject side, that is on the side of the spirit itself, is the Faculty of the True, and regarded on the object side is the Capacity of the True; (2) The Sensibility and the Imagination, the former being the passive and the latter the active side of the function, being respectively the Capacity and the Faculty of Form—or, as the Beautiful is the perfect in form, and this term has accordingly been accepted to denote the category generally of form, the Capacity and Faculty of the Beautiful; (3) The Will or the Capacity and Faculty of the Good.

IV. These three functions, being only forms or modes of activity, are each alike endowed with power; the Intelligence, the Imagination, the Will, are equally in their very essence each a power. Even regarded as capacities, or passive, they are active natures affected by the objects with which they interact; every impression on the capacity, every address to it by the object engaging and determining the related faculty or form of activity.

V. These functions are co-ordinate and complementary. One is not before the other, nor in rank inferior in essential nature; they are alike and to an equal degree to be characterized as rational or spiritual in the highest import of these designations.

The three, moreover, complete or fill out the idea or notion of a rational spirit. There is no other function conceivable; and there can be no rational spirit without each of them.

VI. As functions of one and the same active being, they can never be entirely separated from one another. The rational spirit must in every exertion of its activity be intelligent, feeling or imaginative, and also willing or free.

VII. The spirit may, however, in its specific exertions, give predominance to either function, so that a given specific act may be characterized as predominantly intelligent—as an act of intelligence—or as feeling, or as willing. In addition to this, it should be remarked that in contemplating any rational act or state, we may by our own power of abstraction direct our attention upon either functional manifestation, excluding the others, altho actually present, from our view.

VIII. The exactly analogous truths hold of the three several objects of spiritual activity—the true, the beautiful, and the good. They are co-ordinate and complementary in every such object. Not a real object can be conceived in which the three phases are not discernible; while either may actually predominate, and so characterize the specific experience; and, moreover, the mind's power of abstraction may separate either for its own contemplation so as to make it for the time the exclusive object of attention.

THE THREE FUNCTIONS OF RATIONAL ACTIVITY BELONG TO ALL SPIRIT—TO THE INFINITE AS TO THE FINITE.

We now advance the proposition that these attributes and characteristics must belong to all rational spirits as such by virtue of their very being, it matters not how otherwise distinguished from one another; must belong accordingly alike to God and man.

Infinitude necessarily pertains only to an attribute—to a logical predicate, and can never in exact speech be applied to a proper logical subject, as has been done in some recent discussions most illogically and sophistically. Moreover, and indeed consequently, the term always denotes degree or extent—quantity, never kind. An infinite intelligence, so far as intelligence, differs from a finite accordingly only in respect of degree and

extent. If language is used legitimately, if words are used to mean anything truly, the intelligence of God, altho infinite, is intelligence still, and has all the characteristics and relations of intelligence as such. To talk of the divine intelligence, to talk of God as intelligent while insisting that such intelligence is not essentially the same as human intelligence, is the wildest absurdity. In like manner, if God is a spirit, he is, as such, a spirit in the same sense in which man is a spirit. Otherwise, the language is meaningless. Whatever of anthropomorphism there may be in this conception of God, there is none that mars the soundness of the proposition that, if truly a spirit, God is so far essentially just such a spirit as man, if man be truly a spirit. There may be an infinite reach of power, of knowledge, of capacity for communication with other beings, of plan and purpose beyond that in man; there may be all the difference that can rationally be imagined between a self-existent and a created being; still, if God is a spirit in any sense and in any truth, he is a spirit the same as the human spirit, as respects the attributes known to be essential to the nature of a spirit.

The threefold functional attributes named, of intelligence, imagination or sensibility, and will, farther, we have found to be necessary factors in the idea of a spirit. Man, we have assumed from the settled teachings of psychological science, has these threefold functions; they exist together, co-ordinate and complementary, making up what we call the spiritual part in his complex nature. We now maintain that neither form of activity can be abstracted without destroying the very idea of a rational spirit. If we thus abstract intelligence, and so imagine a being with only the functions of form and of freedom, we have an imaginary being in reciprocating communications with other beings and objects, and exerting its activity on them, with no consciousness of its own feelings and purposes, and with no knowledge of the objects on which it acts, or of any effects produced on them in its action. It is a very monster of fiction. It certainly lacks rationality, lacks responsibility, lacks personality—all which attach to our idea of spirit. It is not rational, nor is it spirit; as much would digestion and respiration without circulation constitute an animal body. There cannot be rational activity without intelligence—without self-conscious-

ness and without knowledge of things without. Just so, if we abstract from this threefold functional nature the capacity and faculty of form—the sensibility and the imagination—that attribute of a spiritual nature by which it is able to communicate with other beings, to impress and receive impressions, and so suppose a being with only intelligence and will, we have a monster of conception that can have no possibility of real existence. Intelligence is impossible without capacity of apprehending the object known; volition, purpose, choice, is equally inconceivable without object to be brought into the apprehension; knowledge is an utter impossibility without faith. Just so, once more, if we abstract from this threefoldness of function, free-will, leaving a being with only the functions of knowing and feeling, we have a conception equally impossible to be realized. At most, we have a mere machine, impressible and impressing and cognizant of itself and of objects around, active as essentially a power, but incapable of guiding or in any way controlling its movements—a mere purposeless machine.

The conclusion is inevitable: God, if a spirit, possesses this threefoldness of functional attribute, inherent in his very being or nature, constituting so far his very essence. There is this threefoldness of function necessarily to be recognized in his very nature, as antecedent to all going forth of his activity, the very ground and condition indeed of any spiritual activity.

EITHER OF THESE RATIONAL FUNCTIONS MAY PREDOMINATE IN ANY SPECIFIC ACT.

We have here to recognize the truth that, with this necessary threefoldness of function in the divine nature as a spirit, either of these functions may predominate and give character to any exertion of power or activity. This truth is brought to our knowledge in the study of the human spirit. In the first place, men, human spirits, differ widely in the degree in which they severally are endowed with these functions. One man is characterized for his intelligence: he is inquisitive and apprehensive and reflective; he is eager for knowledge, he is quick to observe and classify, he is as ready to infer principles from facts; while yet, the instances are familiar, he is wanting in sympathy, in imagination, in taste, and is weak in purpose, hesitating, vacillating,

inefficient. Just so another is endowed with extraordinary sensibility, sympathetic, impressible, and also imaginative, communicative, his whole soul moving in pleasing form and grace, while relatively deficient in learning and science and a weakling in plan and purpose. Still a third may be endowed with extraordinary energy of will, ruling, leading, swaying, dominating. While bearing steadily in our thought that no rational spirit and no specific act or state of a rational spirit can possibly be without the concurrence of all these functions in some degree; that the man of feeling and every state of feeling have some measure of intelligence and freedom however weak and small relatively to this function of feeling; that the men of immense learning and science and every act of knowing have some degrees of sense and freedom; and that every man of strong will and every purpose and volition have something of the function of form and of knowledge; still the truth remains that human spirits do in fact differ indefinitely in the relative degrees in which these several functional capabilities are possessed by them.

Further, nothing is more common to our observation than that the same man at different times and on different occasions does call into exercise a single one of these functional activities so predominantly as to give to the act the character belonging to the particular function engaged. He may surrender himself at one time to feeling, to be simply impressed, without any recognizable reaction of intelligence or of determination and purpose. He may within certain limits give exclusive occasion for either the active or the passive side of his nature, in the exercise of either function, as he may also for either of the several functions themselves. It is in perfect accordance with the most common observation, thus, that a man may give exclusive play to his imagination, keeping back his cognitive and his willing or purposive activity so far as allowed by the necessities of the organic law of his being; he may continue for an hour, for hours, predominantly even for days, or for his lifetime, this so far exclusive imaginative activity. He may busy himself with form and form alone, repressing truth or reality and withholding conscious intentional or purposive determination to an indefinite degree within the limits stated. He may thus be said to live in the imagination; his whole activity engaged in the exercises of



this faculty. At another time the same man may give himself as exclusively to observation and reflection—to be the scholar, the man of science, the philosopher; or to planning, determining, and executing—to be a leader, a master-spirit among men.

THE MANIFESTATION OF EITHER OF THESE RATIONAL FUNCTIONS IS A MANIFESTATION OF PERSON.

We advance now the further proposition that, in perfect accordance with the familiar habits and laws of thought and with the familiar uses and principles of human speech, a rational spirit like man is entitled to be ranked as a person on the exercise of either one of these functions of spirit. The recognized presence of either intelligence, feeling, or will, in any case whatever, justifies us in recognizing a person in it, on the simple ground that each of these is an exclusive attribute of a person.

The activity of the Infinite One accordingly, if a real and veritable spirit, while it must be characterized in every specific exercise by each of the functions essential to a spirit—intelligence, feeling, will—may yet in accordance with the laws or attributes of a spiritual nature give such predominance to either one on a specific occasion as to overshadow or hide the others, so that there shall appear as the proper recognizable characteristic of the exercise only intelligence, or feeling, or will. Moreover, the recognition of such manifestation of either of these forms of functional exertion proves personality and justifies the assertion that a person is concerned in it. Still further, the separate representation of these several functional activities on different occasions, involving personality in each, does not forbid the possibility of the supposition that they all belong to the same one being.

Independently, therefore, of the manifestations by himself of the existence and attributes of God in nature and in revelation we are justified, if not in reason constrained, to presuppose, on entering upon our search after these manifestations and upon our investigation of them, that, if God is, and is a spirit, there must be a threefold distinction in his very nature admitting a specific exercise and manifestation which is properly characterized as tri-personal, inasmuch as such specific exercise may be marked by a predominance of either of these tri-personal functions. A

survey of these manifestations will justify this logical anticipation. In prosecuting this survey it will of course be borne in mind that tri-personality as ascribed to a single being, whether man or God, can import only a threefoldness of essential attributes, either one of which may be manifested to the relative exclusion from view of the other two, and yet, as essential and peculiar to personality, must be admitted, when manifested, to indicate a person

#### PROOFS OF TRI-PERSONALITY IN NATURE.

In the constitution and ordering of the universe of beings around us we at once discover, what we have found in our own personal being, an activity, which as producing change we designate a power or energy or force, and in relation to the results we designate as cause. This activity, this energy or power or force, this cause, is all-pervasive. Not an atom of matter, not a particle of space is without this energy. Gravity, as one form of its exertion, is found wherever matter is found; and the philosophy of heathendom, unenlightened by any written word of revelation, recognized and grandly declared the truth that God is the source of life and action, even of rational life and activity—"we are his offspring." In the profounder and fuller expression of the apostle, it is "in him we live and move and have our being." This energy is by philosophy and science alike recognized to be as immeasurable in intensity or degree as it is illimitable in extent. An infinite energy in the universe is with paltry exceptions accepted by all, by the unbelieving equally as by the Christian.

The specific exertions of this infinite energy, further, are everywhere characterized by the three essential attributes of what we understand by a spiritual nature, of what we designate a spirit. The order that pervades the universe of matter and mind, or, more technically, the congruousness in the relationships of parts to one another and to the whole of which they are parts, is at once the product and the object of intelligence. This order, this congruousness, this phase of being which we designate *the true* in it, is exclusively from and of intelligence as well as exclusively for it, so that intelligence acting in re-

spect to nature and the true in nature are exactly commensurate as they are exact correlatives. Slowly, reluctantly, as with the throes of a most laborious parturition, and with the exultations that follow the sense of a marvellous achievement effected, modern science at last proclaims that the principle of the universe, scientifically or in relation to the intelligence, is LAW—a grand, sublime, most significant truth, but approximating most closely to a simple truism. For what is law, if at least we leave out of view as unhappily they seem inclined to do who are loudest in proclaiming the new attainment of science—if we leave out the notion of lawgiver implied in the very term—what is law but order, truth—the true—the congruous in thought between the universe and its parts? Gravitation, to take an exemplification of one form of this infinite energy, is a law, is perfect order, is exact congruousness of part with part and of part with the gravitating universe, is *the true* in relation to this specific exertion of the infinite energy; and as law, as order, as the congruous and the true, is for the intellect, not for the sense or the will. It is as such simply known, not felt; it neither engages nor determines our free will.

The interaction between all the parts of the universe, again, the action and reaction, the reciprocation of influence and impression between the parts, the universal sympathy and communicativeness in giving and receiving, in modifying and being modified, which we technically recognize as coming under the category of the beautiful, that characteristic in all things by means of which they may communicate and receive communication, which we call the *form* in things in distinction from the essence, is another property of this infinite energy discoverable in all, but peculiarly marking certain specific exercises or manifestations of it. Everywhere we find this form in things; it belongs to an energy as shaping things, so that they reciprocally impress and are impressed. The infinite energy displayed in the universe has this personal character, accordingly, that one of its functional modes is that of forms—active and receptive sense.

The infinite energy, once more, in specific exertions appears characterized as aiming, determining, intending, end-reaching, in other words, as will. There is not a manifestation of this

energy in the universe, material or spiritual, which does not bear this telic character. It marks all producing and all products, all that is and all that comes to be, everything and every change. Every theory of the universe openly or covertly admits this truth. The theory of fate implies a will-power, altho it treats it as irrational, that is without wisdom and without sympathy or love. So the theory of necessity implies a will as determining, executing, and reaching ends, but mistakes for necessity the uniformity of perfect wisdom that guides ever to the best and highest ends, and must act in the same way, in the same conditions and for the same specific ends. The great fact that in nature and in history the infinite energy which disposes all things and all events is aiming, determining, end-seeking, is beyond question.

Observation thus demonstrates the Infinite One, as actually present and acting in his boundless energy in the universe, to be characterized by these several functional attributes—intelligence, sense, will—which are inseparably conjoined as organic parts of the same one whole, while yet the one or the other may predominate in any specific manifestation and so give character to it.

Now each specific manifestation of this energy, characterized on different occasions, respectively as intelligence or sense or will, or in the corresponding objective designation, as the true or the beautiful or the good, may with perfect propriety and truth be regarded as personal. Let us suppose, for illustration, a man who as nearly as we can conceive is pure intelligence, without sensibility or imagination and also without will,—mere dry unfeeling, purposeless intellect. The universe is, to him as he contemplates it, merely order or law, merely the congruous, merely the true. He recognizes an energy, an infinite energy, but it is purely intellectual. It is impossible that he should not judge this energy, as he judges his own exerted energy, to be personal, the attribute and so the sign and proof of a personal being. He would to himself and every other dry intellect like himself properly and truly represent this being, thus acting simply as intelligence, to be a person. Suppose now another man as exclusively a man of sensibility and imagination looking out upon the universe. He would meet

only manifestations of an infinite energy everywhere as forms, fitted not to stir the intellect, but to engage the sense, to enthrall with its beauty. As he recognizes himself, altho but a subject of sense, yet to be a person, he could not untruthfully denominate this energy as personal: he would properly declare this being, putting forth an infinite energy in forms of beauty, to be a person. Suppose, still further, a third, who is as fully characterized by his determining and executing energy, and is conscious, as far as may be, of his being only such a force, meeting other like force or forces without him, so that all nature and history to him should be only determining and end-seeking and end-reaching; he in his turn, recognizing himself to be a will-power and as such to be a person, would denominate this being, willing and determining and effecting in the universe, to be also and equally a person.

We should have, thus, as the legitimate conclusions from these several relationships to natural things and events three infinite persons which would naturally be named in a threefold way: in one case, for instance, Wisdom; in the second, Love; in the third, Authority. Suppose a fourth with these several functions of spirit in equipoise to receive these several conclusions and denominations respecting the Infinite One; he would regard them as equally true, equally legitimate, equally natural. And to make himself intelligible in his communings with them he would naturally speak sometimes of the Infinite One as the Divine Wisdom, sometimes as the Divine Love, sometimes as the Divine Authority; and yet we can see he might without difficulty conceive ever of but one person who according to the dictates of the occasion might be designated from either personal function. To him the Infinite One would be in a legitimate sense tri-personal while yet absolutely one and the same being.

#### SCRIPTURAL TEACHINGS.

Turning now to the manifestations which God has made of himself in proper revelation, and contemplating them in a spirit of simple docility as also with becoming reverence, we shall find that the anticipations prompted by what we know of



our own spiritual nature and the clear corroborations of these anticipations in what we observe in nature and providence, have in this written revelation an ample support and confirmation.

1. *God is one—a Spirit that knows, feels, and wills.*

We find there affirmed abundantly and emphatically that the God of the Bible is one God. It is also as clearly taught that he is a spirit. It is recorded in equal clearness and fullness that there are in the Divine nature these three functions of intelligence, feeling, and will. His is infinite wisdom and knowledge—the infinite Intelligence. He is described as “a God of knowledge,” “who knoweth the secrets of the heart,” “knoweth all things,” “his understanding [intelligence] is infinite.” It is equally declared that “God is Love,” “gracious and full of compassion,” “the earth is full of his mercy;” in communication with his creatures, “revealing the things that concern him even to babes;” affected by men, “angry with the wicked every day,” “taking pleasure in them that fear him,” “joying over them;” and reciprocally impressing them, “satisfying the longing soul,” allowing to his servants “fellowship with the Father and the Son.” He is moreover declared to be a being that wills, that determines, that purposes, that accomplishes, that rules and governs and disposes. He is free and sovereign: “what his soul desireth, even that he doeth;” “he hath done whatsoever he pleased;” “declaring the end from the beginning and from ancient times the things that are not yet done, saying, ‘My counsel shall stand, and I will do all my pleasure;’” his “is the purpose that is purposed upon the whole earth;” he is “the blessed and only Potentate.” These are but scattered instances of the teachings of the Bible setting forth these several functional attributes of the Deity. Revelation, then, is in perfect accord with psychology and with natural theology in ascribing to the Infinite Spirit the three functions essential to rational spirit as spirit of intelligence, sensibility, and will.

No imputation of anthropomorphism here can shake this position. That the scriptural representations of the Divine nature are essentially changed from the truth and reality in order to bring them within the capacity of human thought is an assumption as intrinsically unsound as it is without reason-

ble ground. If these representations are veritable representations at all, and are not nonsense and a cheat, they are representations of something real, some fact or truth; and if not representations of these particular facts and truths in the Divine nature, of actual thoughts and feelings and purposes, it is beyond the power of man to guess what they are; they are in fact utterly illusive. But, further, these verbal revelations are in exact correspondence with the manifestations of the Divine attributes in nature and history. Unless, then, human thought is utterly untrustworthy, these three constituents of all spirit are actual attributes of God.

2. *The Scriptures designate God by distinctive names denoting this tri-functional nature.*

We find in the Scriptures three distinct appellations of the Godhead, and these appellations are determined from the three-fold mode of activity or of function proper to rational spirit. When thus God is represented in the Scriptures as manifesting himself predominantly and characteristically in the functional activity of will, he is denominated the Father; when appearing in the function of form, that is as medium of communication with other beings, he is denominated the Son; and when appearing characteristically in the function of intelligence or the faculty of the True, he is denominated the Holy Spirit.

Let us keep steadily in view, as we proceed, the positions already taken: (1) That all spirits, insofar as spirits, whether finite or infinite or however otherwise differing from one another, are real energies with the three co-ordinate and complementary functions that have been named; (2) That in specific exertions of energy, either one of these functions may predominate and give character to the manifestation, altho in fact never unaccompanied with the others, being but functional parts of the same one organic whole; and (3) That human thought and human speech recognize the perfect propriety of designating such a specific manifestation so characterized as personal, each of these functions being a proper attribute of personality.

In examining now the actual teachings of the word of God, we find, first, that there is in the Godhead something that warrants a threefold designation by the three conjoined denomina-

tions of Father, Son, and Spirit ; as in the baptismal formula and in the formula of the benediction. These, it will be noted, are personal designations. The names are names of persons. There is then scriptural warrant for recognizing some kind of a true tri-personality in the nature of the One God. We have seen how, in accordance with the customary modes of thought and uses of language among men, such a tri-personality is perfectly congruous with a veritable unity of being.

In the next place, the Scriptures expressly characterize the Father as Will, the Son as Form, and the Spirit as Truth. The Father is identified with Jehovah: "I will declare the decree [the purpose of redemption under a mediatorial kingdom in the counsels of eternity]; the LORD [Jehovah] hath said unto me: Thou art my Son; this day have I begotten thee." The name of Jehovah, further, is assumed by God because of its being significant of sovereignty—of supremacy of rule, of will. Here, to use the words of Delitzsch, "God gives to the meaning of his own mysterious name [Jehovah] the will, which wills itself and determines itself, as the root." By making himself known to Moses under this name, God signified to him that his special relationship to the people of Israel thereafter was to be characterized by sovereignty of rule. He appeared to Abraham, to Isaac, and to Jacob, as he declares, in the comprehensive attribute of power, "by the name of God Almighty," and was not known to them by this his name of Jehovah; that is, in the more specific way of authority or rule. God in the characteristic manifestation of himself as will, as supreme, sovereign will, is thus in the Scriptures denominated Jehovah.

In like manner, the Scriptures declare the Son to be the Form of God. He is, thus, "the image of the invisible God;" "the brightness of his glory and the express image of his person;" "in the form of God;" the outward manifestation, as it is said, "in him dwelleth all the fulness of the Godhead *bodily*."

Once more, the Scriptures declare the Holy Ghost to be the "Spirit of Truth;" he is indeed the Truth itself—"the Spirit is Truth." The name Paraclete, Comforter, given him by our Lord indicates his official character as minister of truth.

In perfect accordance with these representations of the distinctive functional characteristics of the Father, Son, and Holy

Ghost respectively, the Scriptures ascribe distributively the several operations of the Infinite Energy to one or the other as thus denominated according as these operations are respectively characterized by Will, or Feeling, or Intelligence. If God is represented as exerting will, putting forth purpose, decree, exercising authority and rule, he is designated as Jehovah—the Father; if in relationships of interaction with other beings, he is designated as the Son; and if specifically and functionally as Intelligence or in relation to the True, he is designated as the Spirit, the Holy Ghost.

Purposing is thus exclusively ascribed to the Father—Jehovah. It is Jehovah who says: "As I have purposed, so shall it stand;" "I have purposed it, and will not repent." It is Jehovah who is represented as having "purposed upon Egypt;" "The Lord of Hosts hath purposed;" "His purposes that he hath purposed against the inhabitants of Teman." In accordance with this in the New Testament it is God the Father to whom choice and purpose and will are ascribed in distinction from the Son and Spirit. Thus: "Blessed be the God and the Father of our Lord Jesus Christ, who hath blessed us with all spiritual blessings in heavenly places in Christ, according as he hath chosen us in him before the foundation of the world, that we should be holy and without blame before him in love: having predestinated us unto the adoption of children by Jesus Christ to himself according to the good pleasure of his will; . . . having made known unto us the mystery of his will according to his good pleasure which he hath purposed in himself, . . . according to the purpose of him who worketh all things after the counsel of his own will." The Father—Jehovah—decrees the mediatorial decree, as already noted. The Father sends, the Son is sent: "the living Father hath sent me," says Christ. Christ is the servant whom Jehovah has chosen. So the Holy Ghost "proceedeth from the Father."

In like manner the offices specially attributed to the Son are those pertaining to communication of being with being—to the psychological function of form. It is the Son by whom the Godhead, and also the will of God, that is the Father, are manifested. "No man hath seen God at any time; the only begotten Son, which is in the bosom of the Father, he hath declared

him." The Son is set forth as "the image of the invisible God:" "He that hath seen me hath seen the Father." He is the medium of communication: "the one mediator;" the Logos, or outward expression of the Godhead; the bodily manifestation of God, through whom God's creating will, as also his providential and gracious purpose, is carried out and executed; "by whom are all things;" "by whom God made the worlds;" "by whom all things consist." He is the only medium of access to God: "No man cometh to the Father but by me." He is, above all and characteristically, the suffering God; it is "he that hath suffered." So it is his office to exemplify the divine ideal to man, to be the perfect model and pattern.

The characteristic offices, once more, attributed to the Holy Ghost are those pertaining to the psychological function of the Intelligence as the correlative subject of the True. As "the Spirit of Truth," he "searches all things:" he is the spirit of knowledge—"The things of God knoweth no man, but the Spirit of God:" he is the teacher—"He will guide you into all truth;" "The Holy Ghost shall teach you:" the spirit of prophetic truth and utterance—"the Spirit of God came upon him and he prophesied among them;" "Zacharias was filled with the Holy Ghost and prophesied;" "Holy men of old spake as they were moved by the Holy Ghost;" "it was revealed unto him by the Holy Ghost;" the prophet Agabus "signified by the Spirit:" he is the spirit that works conviction—"he will reprove the world of sin, and of righteousness, and of judgment:" he is the witness-bearer—"the Spirit itself beareth witness:" he performs his office-work of sanctifier through the truth—"through sanctification of the Spirit and belief of the truth."

It is most obvious from this survey of the leading passages in the revealed Scriptures bearing upon the distinctive offices of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost, that these offices respectively correspond exactly with the tri-personal functions of will, sense and imagination, and intelligence. There is nothing that will be found contradictory to these teachings elsewhere in the Scriptures, if it be borne in mind that any given manifestation of God may be represented here as of the Father, there as of the Son, elsewhere still as of the Spirit, according as the particular design in the representation points to the one or the other



of these functions all of which, as organic parts of the same whole of being, must concur in every manifestation. The Father in one view may thus in another view be the Son or the Spirit.

There are several passages calling here for distinct consideration, as showing how, without at all destroying this tri-personal distinction but rather strongly confirming it, the same divine being is at one point denominated in one way and at another point in another way. The apparent contradiction is solved in the light of this distinction. In these passages we have theophanies in which at one point in the transaction it is the "angel of Jehovah," "the angel of God," who appears and speaks, and at another it is Jehovah himself or God himself. Thus in Gen. xxii. 15 it is said, "the angel of the Lord called unto Abraham;" while in the next verse he is identified with Jehovah: "by myself have I sworn, saith the Lord." So "the angel of God spake" unto Jacob declaring himself to be God himself: "I am the God of Bethel." We find the same mode of representation elsewhere. The angel of Jehovah appears to Moses; God speaks.

#### PROOF FROM THE REVEALED STAGES IN THE MANIFESTATIONS OF GOD TO MAN.

We have a strong independent confirmation of the correctness of this exposition of the scriptural teaching as to the tri-personality of the Godhead—that it is grounded upon the threefoldness of function recognized as pertaining to the very essence of rational spirits—in the revealed unfolding of the Deity to man by clearly distinguishable stages. It was the general attribute of power in which God began his special revelations of himself to his chosen people. Thus to Abraham he declared: "I am the Almighty God." He revealed himself next to Moses in the attribute of authority signified by the name—Jehovah—then specially chosen out of his diverse denominations: "God spake unto Moses and said unto him, I am the Lord [Jehovah]; and I appeared unto Abraham and unto Isaac and unto Jacob by the name of God Almighty; but by my name Jehovah was I not known to them." In the prophetic vision accorded to Moses' request that he might be shown the

divine glory, the form of God, or perhaps the fullest and clearest possible manifestation of the Godhead, it was signified that in the coming future God would manifest himself more signally in the attribute of love—of sympathy and communion: “the Lord passed by before him and proclaimed the Lord, the Lord God, merciful and gracious.” The Godhead, the Godhead as Will, he thus taught Moses, was in some coming time to appear characteristically as mercy and grace—the very character ever given to the Son. Then, still further, we learn particularly from the New Testament Scriptures that the revelation of the Godhead specially and characteristically as the Spirit of Truth was to follow the dispensation through the Son.

These stages of the unfolding by God of himself begin thus, first, with the attribute of power, which is the very essence of all rational spirit, and as such must pervade every functional manifestation of a spiritual nature; it is followed by the primary functional attribute of authority or will; which again is followed by the attribute of love—medium of communion, impressing and impressible; and this, finally, by the attribute which has to do with truth—the Spirit of Truth—the Intelligence.

#### SUPPORT FROM CHRISTIAN THINKERS OF DIFFERENT TIMES.

That the Tri-personality of the Godhead has its seat somehow in the psychological threefoldness of function in the rational spirit seems to have been impressed very extensively on the minds of leading Christian thinkers and biblical scholars from ancient times down to the present. That they should have failed to satisfy the mass of believers generally is not strange, since such a satisfactory exposition must be impossible except on the condition of a matured psychology. The objective enumeration of mental phenomena—the true, the beautiful, and the good—was, indeed, generally received in the earliest times of Christianity; but its correspondence with the subjective enumeration of the present time—the intelligence, the sensibility, and the will—has been only of recent recognition. Moreover, the modern psychological treatment of the sensibility has been vague and unsatisfactory. Not till the sensibility and the imagination should be recognized as the passive and active phases

respectively of the one function of form, could the psychological exposition of the scriptural Trinity in the Godhead easily be accepted. On this matured teaching of psychological science—that the three functions of knowing, feeling, and choosing have their exact correspondences in their respective objects, the true, the beautiful, and the good; and that they are true and exact co-ordinates and complementaries in relation to one another constituting the entire functional nature of the spirit—such a psychological exposition of the scriptural Trinity can be securely grounded, and it may be added on this teaching alone.

Of the more ancient theologians treating of this subject may be cited Augustine, who gave divers psychological expositions of the Trinity; as memory, intelligence, will; also, as mind (*mens*), intellect, will; still further, as being, willing, knowing: also Gregory of Nyssa, a contemporary of Augustine, who expounded it as spirit, word, mind (*nous*).

Of modern theologians may be cited Mr. Baxter, who distinguished the three persons in the Godhead respectively as wisdom or understanding, power, and love; Dr. Watts, who represents the Logos as the wisdom of God and the Holy Spirit as the divine power; Delitzsch, who in his "Biblical Psychology," after expounding the life of the spirit as a threefold unity of will, thought, and experience, represents in accordance with this exposition the process of the Divine Trinity in the forms (1) of the will, (2) of thought and knowledge, and (3) of experience; Dr. Shedd in his "History of Christian Dogmatics," who says: "The necessary conditions of self-consciousness in the finite spirit furnish an analog to the doctrine of the Trinity and go to prove that trinity in unity is necessary to self-consciousness in the Godhead." Similarly Phillips Brooks in his "Influence of Jesus" observes: "In the constitution of humanity we have the fairest written analog and picture of the Divine Existence."

The exposition of the meaning and nature of the Divine Tri-personality, thus supported by the recent psychological teaching, by the representations of Scripture, as well as by theological interpreters of high authority, and, as is believed, obnoxious to no destructive criticism, must, if accepted as true, be also accepted as of the utmost significance and moment to religious belief and practice.

It helps to the removal of some serious difficulties in the way of accepting the prevalent theological doctrine of a tri-personal God. It explains thus how the term *person* is legitimately applied to these several functional manifestations of the Godhead. It explains how the Son should be represented as inferior and subject to the Father in perfect consistency with the taught equality of one with the other: the will is the logical primitive of all specific spiritual functional activity, and in this aspect is rightly viewed as superior and sovereign, as the Father in relation to the Son. It explains how it is that we have the three dispensations succeeding one another as the Scriptures represent them: the first, of authority and rule, as that of the Father—Jehovah; the second, of love and mercy, that of the Son; and the third and last, of the truth, that of the Spirit. It enables us to understand more fully the relationships between these dispensations and their significance to each other, as well as thus to enter more fully into the design and import of each, and the reasons in the divine counsels for this precise order of manifestation. It sheds a new, and with advancing reflection will continue to shed an ever-increasing, light on the office and ministry of the Son in the great scheme of redemption. The whole conception of the nature and office of the Son in redemption, it is believed, will be greatly helped in the light of this exposition. So, too, the conception of the office of the Holy Ghost, as emphatically the Spirit of Truth, will be at once more exactly defined and more clearly and fully opened. Indeed the whole scriptural representation of the respective offices of the several persons in the sacred Trinity must receive a fuller and truer light from it.

This exposition of the Divine Tri-personality, it would seem, should tend to bring into accord orthodox Trinitarianism and evangelical Unitarianism. On both sides, tri-theism is with like earnestness disowned; on both sides, it is held that divine manifestations are characterized in the Scriptures as being respectively those of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost. The difficulty has been that Tri-personality has been pressed by one side, so as to seem to the other to involve threefoldness of being; and on the other, the unity of the divine nature has been urged so vigorously as to seem to throw doubt on the

scriptural representations concerning the divine nature in the Son and the Spirit. In actual discussion Trinitarianism has been at times driven to take refuge in weak nescience, and try to satisfy itself and its opponents with the plea that the divine nature is incomprehensible to man, that there are mysteries in the Infinite unfathomable to the finite intelligence, forgetting that if there were any force in the plea there was a sad mistake in ever undertaking to put forth any dogma respecting the nature of God. Unitarianism, on the other hand, in its defences, could only emphasize the scriptural affirmations of the unity of God and insist that as Jehovah was positively declared to be God, there could be no room for allowing proper deity to the Son and the Spirit, and therefore that all the threefoldness recognized in God must be only modal, occasional, or purely rhetorical. But if the view we have taken be correct, these opposing opinions may be brought into harmony. There is emphatically one only God. He is, however, a spirit, and as a spirit must have the threefold functional character of all rational spirit. The trinity in the Godhead is, therefore, in the very nature of God and logically before all manifestation of himself, before all putting forth of the divine energy. The exercise predominantly of either function, possible in any specific act, characterizes the act as one of knowing, feeling, or choosing, which, as it still carries with it all the functions of the same organic being, altho relatively in different degrees of prominence, may legitimately be characterized as personal and be denominated in the respective cases by the personal distinctions of Father, Son, and Spirit. Moreover, in the economy of redemption, that is in all God's dealings with man, there is a clear and satisfactory reason apparent why the Father as the characteristic impersonation of will and purpose should have priority to be succeeded in their order by the Son and the Spirit as the characteristic impersonations of the other two functions of the divine nature. Every true theist may consistently accept such a tri-personal functional expression of the divine energy. If he accede to the established truths of psychology respecting rational spirit, he cannot indeed withhold such acceptance. Monotheism is thus necessitated under



the guidance of a true psychology to accept the doctrine of the Divine Tri-personality.

May the good time soon come when all believers in the One God, who is the Creator and Sovereign of all, shall unitedly subscribe to the name of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost, the one God over all, blessed forever!

HENRY N. DAY.

## PERSONALITY AND LAW—THE DUKE OF ARGYLL.

IT is now sixteen years since the Duke of Argyll published "The Reign of Law." In the preface to that work there was an intimation that the subject might be further pursued at some future time. That has now been done. In ten successive articles, or chapters, on "The Unity of Nature," published in the *Contemporary Review*, and soon to be gathered into a volume, we have a sequel to that work of great ability and value.

By these works the Duke has laid his contemporaries and those who shall come after under an obligation it would be difficult to estimate. "The Reign of Law" was published opportunely. Physical science had achieved great triumphs both as science and as subservient to the practical purposes of life. In view of this, not her special devotees alone, but all right-thinking men were exultant. In the deeper insight into Nature, and in the more efficient and wider control of her forces, they found new stimulus to inquiry and an added dignity to life. But in connection with this, and deriving prestige from it, there had come in a materialistic philosophy, shrouding in twilight, if not extinguishing, the hope of a future life, tending to lower the tone of morality, and changing the benignant aspect of law into the sternness and rigidity of fate. Every physical event was under law. Law was fixed, settled, uniform. It must be to be law. There was, therefore, under the reign of law thus viewed, an order of events that was a barrier to prayer, and that no will could change. At this juncture it was an unspeakable relief to many to be shown that events are brought about, not by a single force or law, but by a combination and adjustment of forces not only admitting but requiring the interposition of purpose and will, and that this rigidity, this inflexibility and absolute uniformity of law, is the very feature of it that makes the whole system of laws capable of being adjusted by will and flexible to

its purposes. This the Duke showed in "The Reign of Law" with great beauty and amplitude of illustration, and with a clearness that left no room for doubt. Scope was thus given to freedom, and a way was opened for an answer to prayer not only, but for an answer without a miracle.

Another concomitant and outgrowth of the materialistic combined with the scientific movement was a denial of purpose in Nature as reached by contrivance. The question here involved is fundamental; for if purpose reached by contrivance cannot be found in Nature, man has no data on which to base the belief of an Intelligence and a Will back of Nature.

In discussing this question the Duke showed that contrivance for the accomplishment of purpose is a necessity that arises out of the immutability of Natural Forces, and that the whole order of Nature is one vast system of contrivance by which the unchangeable demands of Law are met and satisfied. As a part of this discussion we have an investigation of "the machinery of flight," than which there is nothing of the kind in the language more original and beautiful.

But ample as is the exposition of contrivance in Nature, and satisfactory as it must be to those who admit it to be contrivance, perhaps a word may be added to meet the sceptical attitude of those who deny that. That there should be such denial on the part of any who study Nature is surprising, since purpose and contrivance, or that which simulates them, are the only stimulus and guide in such study. We study Nature for the thought that is in it. If we deny to it thought as revealed in contrivance and purpose, it means nothing, and can no more be studied than a book that means nothing. That there are in Nature numberless instances of what would be contrivance if arranged by man no one can doubt. No definition of a contrivance can be framed that these will not satisfy. The question then is, and the only question, Have we a right to regard these arrangements as caused by a Being having Intelligence and Will analogous to our own? This we naturally believe. If it be not so, language is falsely constructed, for, as the Duke has shown, those who deny it are constantly obliged to use language that implies it. If it be not so, if these marvellous appearances of purpose and contrivance are mere semblances, then Nature

herself is constructed on the principle of falsehood. It would be interesting, if there were space, to trace this phase of scepticism to its source.

Passing to his papers on "The Unity of Nature," we find the Duke carrying over the universality of Law as an element of that Unity. In doing this he shows the extent of the unity, involving as it does the interaction of light and heat and gravitation, which seem to pervade all space, and the adjustment of these, together with that of the substances of Nature with their chemical laws, to the demands of organic and sensitive life. He shows, in opposition to the agnostics, that man has power to attain valid knowledge on these subjects, and still that he is no exception to the unity of Nature because of this, or because of his capacity, denied to the brutes, of improvement as a race. He does show, however, that man is an exception to that unity by his capacity of retrogression or development downwards, and by the fact of such development. "That," he says in his sixth paper, "which is rarely exceptional, and indeed absolutely singular in man, is the persistent tendency of his development to take a wrong direction." He shows, as Whately had shown before him, that man could not have been originally a savage; and in treating of the history of religion he makes it clear that "the famous generalization by Comte of the four necessary stages in the history of religion" is baseless. Instead of the order fetishism, polytheism, monotheism, and then Comtism, he shows that monotheism was first.

Round each of the points above mentioned, as well as others treated of, strong interest gathers at the present time. In the discussion of these we are struck with the clearness of the statements made, and with the ample equipment of knowledge in natural history, in physics, in historical research, and in mental and moral science that reveals itself as it is needed. We admire also the uniform candor manifested towards those of opposing views, and the modesty which led the Duke to say, in the preface to his papers on the Unity of Nature which he proposes to publish in a volume, "The publication of it as a series of articles in this Review, before its final appearance as a volume, will afford me, I hope, the advantage of hearing and of seeing what may be said and written of its errors or of its deficiencies."

In accordance with the above suggestion, and recognizing fully the great service done by these works, we venture to inquire whether the relation of Personality to Law, constantly involved in the discussion, is rightly given—whether the theory of the reign of natural law and of the unity of Nature is not so carried out as to trench, not avowedly, but logically and really, on the sphere and prerogatives of personality.

In doing this we first notice the chapter on "The Supernatural," and the conception of that that runs through both works. Of the relation of man to Nature there are two distinct conceptions. These are clearly seen and distinctly stated by the Duke. In his first paper on the Unity of Nature he says: "And of this unity we who see it, and think of it, and speak of it—we are a part. In body and in mind we belong to it, and are included in it." That is one view. Of this he says, "It is more easy to admit this as a general proposition than really to see it as a truth and to accept all the consequences it involves. The habitual attitude of our thoughts is certainly not in accordance with it." We have here an admission which involves a strong presumption against his proposition. But he goes on to say, and this gives the other view, "We look on 'Nature' as something outside of us—something on which we can look down, or to which we can look up, according to our mood; but in any case as something in which we are exceptions, and which we can and ought to regard from an external point of view." That it is natural for us thus to regard nature as "something outside of us" he admits still more distinctly in his fifth paper. He says, "We are all quite accustomed to think of man as not belonging to Nature at all—as the one thing or being which is contradistinguished from Nature. This is implied in the commonest use of language, as when we contrast the works of man with the works of Nature. The same idea is almost unconsciously involved in language which is intended to be strictly philosophical, and in the most careful utterances of our most distinguished scientific men." This he says. He also says that there is no other objection to the definition of the Supernatural given by Dr. Bushnell, which includes man, "than that it rests upon a limitation of the terms 'Nature' and 'natural' which is very much at variance with the sense in which they are commonly



understood." The following is the definition by Dr. Bushnell as quoted in "The Reign of Law:" "That is supernatural, whatever it be, that is either not in the chain of natural cause and effect, or which acts on the chain of cause and effect in Nature from without the chain." Here the distinction between the natural and supernatural is clearly drawn. According to this Nature is to be regarded as a system of uniformities within which there is no self-determination, no original causation, and no freedom. This, we venture to say, is the conception of Nature in the minds of most men, and any definition of it that would include a power of self-determination, or of original causation, or of acting from without upon its ongoing as a chain of cause and effect would be more at variance with what is commonly understood by the word Nature than one which would exclude man so far as he is free and is an original cause. Indeed, the conception of freedom, and that of subjection to natural law so as to be within the chain of cause and effect, are incompatible. The one thing which gives Nature its value as a basis of experience is its uniformity. No matter what the cause of this may be, it is independent of the human will, and the movement assumes to us the aspect of necessity. The conditions being given, the element of a uniformity that is independent of the human will is that which is essential to our conception of a Nature. Back of that there may be what is called necessity, or fate, or the Divine Will, but let there be an absolutely uniform ongoing, having, or seeming to have, its cause within itself, and we have what constitutes our conception of a Nature. We have what we need as a basis for experience, and for the responsible action of a free being.

What the Duke would include within Nature we do not precisely know. Failing to draw at the point of self-determination and freedom the only line that can be drawn between Nature and the supernatural, we sometimes find him, as near the close of his fourth paper, assigning to man a power over Nature which we should call supernatural. He says, "Nor can there be any doubt as to what are the supreme faculties of the human mind. The power of initiating changes in the order of Nature and of shaping them to the noblest ends—this, in general terms, may be said to include or involve the whole of them." Again, in

"The Reign of Law," p. 279, we find him virtually denying, as it seems to us, the possibility of freedom. He says, "If these conclusions be true, it follows that, whether as regards that in which Force in itself consists, or as regards the conditions under which Force is used, it need not surprise us if in passing from the material world to the world of Mind we see that Law, in the same sense, prevails in the phenomena of both." Once more, we find him, as in his third paper, using language in regard to Nature which would not only include within it intelligences superior to man, but would seem to include God himself, and so be pantheistic. He says, "We have been created, or—if any one likes the phrase better—we have been 'evolved;' not, however, out of nothing, nor out of confusion, nor out of lies, but out of 'Nature,' which is but a word for the sum of all existence—the source of all order, and the very ground of all truth—the fountain in which all fulness dwells." It was not meant so, but if this be not an identification of God with Nature, what would be? But finally, and naturally enough, we find him so troubled with the word supernatural that he wishes it banished from the language, and gives his reasons. He says, "It would be well if this word were altogether banished from our vocabulary." This is a perilous assertion for one to make respecting a word so domiciled in the language who says a little farther on of human speech that it is "that sure record of the deepest metaphysical truths." His reasons, however, are, that "It assumes that we know all that 'Nature' contains, and that we can pronounce with certainty on what can and what cannot be found there. Or else it assumes that nature is limited to purely physical agencies, and that our own mind is a power and agency wholly distinct from these." Certainly it does assume that we can know, not all that can be found in nature, but what can *not* be found there. And that we do know. We know that self-determination and freedom, and moral character, cannot be found in what is commonly called "Nature," and no confusion could be greater than would come from an attempt to blend the two. Nor does it assume that Nature is limited to purely physical agencies, or that the mind is a power and agency wholly distinct from these. As has been said, the essential idea of "Nature" is uniformity from a cause independent of the human

will. Hence "Nature" may, and does, come up into mind and find a sphere there as well as in matter, since we have in that, uniformities or laws, as those of Association. Universally, so far as there are uniformities in mind not dependent on its own choice, it has a nature, and is subject to laws analogous to physical laws. That man as a whole has more often been regarded as a part of Nature is true. This has been from his complex nature, and because he is so to so great an extent. All that is below him is within Nature. He is a partaker of that. If we make, as in "The Outline Study of Man" the upward movement of Nature to be by successive platforms where all that is below is constantly carried up, while at each platform, and for its formation, something new is added so that the column constantly diminishes in extent and increases in comprehension, all difficulty at this point will vanish. So far as man is material and animal he will be included within Nature; but so far as he is self-determined and free and moral, so far indeed as he is in the image of God, he is above Nature. He must be, or, so far as we can see, God himself is not supernatural.

In this view of it, instead of the confused notion of Nature when no line is drawn, we have a system of uniformities, in itself meaningless and useless, but grand and wonderful as a basis and condition of a free and spiritual system that is as far above it as the heavens are above the earth.

In connection with the Supernatural the Duke treats of miracles; and here also we find the same tendency to extend the domain of Natural Law so as to trench on the prerogatives of personality. "The common idea of a miracle," he says, "is that it is a suspension or violation of the laws of Nature." His own idea of miracle is that "There is nothing in religion incompatible with the belief that all exercises of God's power, whether ordinary or extraordinary, are effected through the instrumentality of means—that is to say, by the instrumentality of natural laws brought out, as it were, and used for a divine purpose." A miracle, he says, "does not involve the idea of an exercise of will apart from the use of means." "It does not involve, therefore, that idea which appears to many so difficult of conception." Again he says, "Nevertheless, so deeply ingrained in the popular theology is the idea that miracles, to be miracles

at all, must be performed by some violation or suspension of the laws of Nature that the opposite idea of miracles being performed by the use of means is regarded with jealousy and suspicion."

In these passages it is implied that for anything to be done without the use of means would be a violation or suspension of the laws of Nature; and is therefore difficult of belief. Is this true? It may well be if what he says on p. 315 of "*The Reign of Law*" be correct. He there says that "all facts which we can bring about must be so brought about by the use of means. This is true universally." He says further in the same connection that "all actions must have a cause, or, in other words, must be brought about by the use of means," thus identifying the use of means with the power of causation. What then do we mean when we say that a thing is done without the use of means? Not certainly that it is done without a cause, but that the will itself, or the personal power of the man, with nothing intervening, is the cause. This we must mean if we mean anything, and meaning this we inquire whether we do not, in all cases of personal and free agency, do something without the use of means. We walk. In doing this we use muscles as means of moving the bones, and nerves as means of moving the muscles, and the brain, if you please, as a means of giving impulse through the nerves; but go back as we may, if we are to have free causation we must reach a point where something is done directly and without the use of means. In using means a first cause must act directly without the use of means. But again, did Christ use means when he called Lazarus from the tomb? Did he when he healed the servant of the centurion in response to a faith which was commended from the very fact that it implied an expectation of its being done without the use of means? "But say the word," said the centurion, "and my servant shall be healed." It is difficult to see what we gain in such a case by interposing a law of which we know nothing, and which would still require the direct agency of a personal will to make use of it.

But if we suppose the cure done by a power residing in the person and put forth by a direct act of will, as when Christ said to the leper, "I will; be thou clean," would that involve any

"violation or suspension" of a law of Nature? And here perhaps it should be said that a law of Nature can be violated only as it is suspended, if, indeed, that would be a violation, and that we can never have evidence that such a law is suspended. It is sometimes said that a law of Nature, the law of gravitation, is violated when a man throws himself from a precipice. A law of the man's nature is violated, but the law of gravitation is perfectly obeyed. If the force implied in the law were suspended the law might be said, in a sense, to be broken, but not when that force is counteracted or overcome by a greater force, for that is constantly done. We do it every time we lift a hand or a foot. When, then, Christ walked upon the water, or said to the winds and waves, "Peace, be still," and they obeyed, we neither have nor can have evidence that any natural law or force was suspended in its action, but only that the forces previously in action were overcome by a mightier force. That a personal Will has control over matter at some points and to some extent must be admitted, or we deny its agency and the possibility of a miracle altogether. Why not, then, suppose such a power to come in as a superior force, not to violate or suspend any law, but to counteract and transcend it, just as the law of gravitation is counteracted and transcended by the law of cohesion, or of chemical affinity, or by the force connected with vegetable life? This would place Personality in a relation to Natural laws wholly different from that which necessitates their use. It makes them the servants of God in the sense in which the centurion said that those under him were his servants. It not only makes them flexible to his will, but gives him the prerogative, when the exigencies of his moral government require it, of acting directly by his will and without their intervention. This view mere science cannot receive. It is not strange that scientific men should be averse to it, but it is strange that one should be averse to it who believes that all the Forces of Nature may have originated in Will. This the Duke of Argyll believes. He quotes with approbation Sir John Herschel as saying that "it is but reasonable to regard the Force of Gravitation as the direct or indirect result of a consciousness or a will existing somewhere," and says himself that it is in the highest degree unphilosophical "to speak or to think as if the Forces



of Nature were either independent of, or separate from, the Creator's Power."

While, therefore, we would not deny, but believe in, the constant intervention of God through the adjustment of laws; and believe also that such intervention may be so conspicuous and in such conjunctures as to have the effect of a miracle, we yet think that the above view is more in accordance with the prerogatives of a Personal God, and brings him nearer to us as a Father and a hearer of prayer. We also think that the above is the natural view, and hence that the credulity of the many, if we must choose between them, is more philosophical than the scepticism of the few. If we give to personality its true place and prerogatives, there is no such antecedent improbability of a miracle in the sense above explained as should prevent an examination of the evidence for it as for any other event, and nothing can be more opposed to the spirit of a true philosophy than the ground taken on this subject by positivists and some scientific men.

In following in their order the chapters in "The Reign of Law," we next reach that on "Law—Its Definitions;" and here we find the same tendency to exaggerate the natural side and to trench on the domain of Personality.

In defining Law it may be questioned whether the Duke has entirely escaped the danger against which he was so evidently on his guard, of using a word in two senses without perceiving it. Seeing clearly the distinction between Law in its primary and secondary senses, he says, "In its primary signification "a law" is the authoritative expression of human will enforced by power." This definition makes no distinction between a law and a command, nor does it admit that an authoritative expression of the Divine Will enters into the primary signification of "a law;" but the objection to it in point here is in the use of the word "power" as that by which law in its primary sense can be enforced. For, having defined "law in its primary sense" as above, he goes on to say that "The instincts, of mankind, finding utterance in the use of language, have not failed to see that the phenomena of Nature are only really conceivable to us as, in like manner, the expression of a Will enforcing itself with Power." It is here said, and so far as there is any recognition

of Law in its primary sense, or of Moral law, throughout the work, it is implied that a law in its primary sense, and a law of Nature, are, *in like manner*, enforced with *Power*. The truth, however, is that law in its primary sense never is or can be enforced by power at all, and that in its secondary or figurative sense it never is or can be enforced by anything else. It is not by "Power" but by punishment that obedience to commands is enforced. Power to inflict punishment is implied, but the enforcement lies wholly in the punishment, and that, too, in the punishment as threatened and when as yet no power has been put forth. A command requires choice and voluntary obedience, and to suppose that these can be produced by power is to break down the distinction between physical law, or a law of Nature, on the one hand, and Civil and Moral Law on the other. In the one case we have an enforcement wholly by punishment; for if there were power without punishment there would be no enforcement, no law even; while in the other case we have enforcement wholly by power, and punishment is impossible.

With the tendency above indicated to identify the two kinds of law, we find the Duke extending its reign into the realm of mind. This he does in a chapter of which the tendency, and we think the logical result, would be an encroachment upon freedom. He says, in the first place, that the Will of man is free in the same sense, and in the same sense only, as the will of an animal, and that it is subject to Law in the same sense, and in that only. Now we say, in the first place, that there is an essential difference between the freedom of man and of animals, in that man has, through his moral nature, presented to him an alternative in *kind*, as the animals have not, and so has moral freedom; and we say, in the second place, that so far as man is free he is not subject at all to Law in any one of its secondary senses. The Duke identifies being subject to Law, and to the influence of motives, but by what right it is difficult to see. We are not subject to motives in any such sense that they are a law to us. He says, "It is true that our Wills can never be free from motives, and in this sense can never be free from Law"—which is just no sense at all. Motives are the condition, and the only condition, on which the Will can be free from Law in any one of its secondary senses as he has given them. He says

"It is from compulsion that our wills are free, and from nothing else." Yes, they are free from *Law* as enforced by *power*, and are free under Law as enforced by punishment.

Of this whole chapter the tendency is indicated by the following sentence: "If these conclusions be true it follows that, whether as regards that in which Force itself consists, or as regards the conditions under which Force is used, it need not surprise us if, in passing from the material world to the world of mind, we see that Law in the same sense prevails in both." This it is the object of the chapter to show, at the same time that it asserts that the Will is free. But the two are incompatible. Where Law prevails *in the same sense* as in the material world there can be no freedom. That it does so prevail in mind up to a certain point, and in reference to certain processes, we agree, but that it prevails at all when we reach the region of choice we deny. Here we hold to the doctrine of a self-originating power, which the Duke denies. "Nor," he says, "does the doctrine of our Free Will assign to the human mind any self-originating power." Certainly it assigns to it no power of originating itself; but if it has not the power within itself of originating a free choice it has no freedom, and if it has not the power of originating action in accordance with that choice it has no efficiency. The antecedent and cause of the choice is a being capable of making it, two objects or courses of action being presupposed between which the choice is to be made. These objects or courses of action are commonly called *motives*, but the moving power is wholly within.

To the chapter on "Creation by Law" there is no objection if we understand by creation the formation of new structures out of materials already existing. It is in this sense that the Duke uses the term, and he makes no reference to any other. In doing this he assumes that personality has not the power, supposed by many to belong to it, of originating the material itself. The material being supposed to exist, we have reason to believe that God proceeded according to a regular order, or, if you please, "Law," to build up the world and the organized structures upon it, but whence the material? Did he originate that? That it is impossible for us to conceive the mode of such origination is conceded, but then we cannot con-

ceive the mode of doing anything unless we have in some measure the power of doing the same *kind* of thing. Shall we then deny to God the power to do anything different in kind from what we can do? It does not seem reasonable unless we know enough of him and his resources to know that it would involve a contradiction. Whatever would not involve a contradiction God can do. To originate actual substance may seem to some to involve a contradiction, but the more we investigate matter the less we know about it, and if we suppose with Boscovich that it consists of centres of attraction and repulsion, or with many philosophers and physicists now, that it is a permanent form of force, there would seem to be no more difficulty about its origin than about the origin of the force of gravity. We may therefore safely say that to originate and uphold such a form of being as matter is, seemingly so solid, and yet, as we investigate it, so elusive, may not involve a contradiction.

This meaning of "creation," involving as it does personal prerogative, cannot be ignored, for if matter was not originated in time it must have been as eternal as God himself. Would the Duke say that? But if eternal, then, so far as we can see, it must have been independent, if not unchangeable, and its marvellous adaptability must have been wholly accidental. That adaptability is so found both in the constitution of the elements of matter and in the relative quantity of what seem to be its various kinds, that it was said by Faraday to have every appearance of being a manufactured article. Take oxygen, for example. See how it unites with hydrogen to form water, and with the various metallic bases to form the rocks and the earths, and think how precise the original quantity must have been to enable it to take up all the material for these and then have just enough left to be diluted by nitrogen and form our atmosphere. A larger or a smaller quantity left over would have unfitted the atmosphere for the use of animals and vegetables as now constituted. Then, too, as combined in the atmosphere, how great the variety of uses to which that is put! See it the breath of life to all that lives, and the destroying agent of all that is dead; see it brightening the flame of the artisan, distilling the waters of the ocean, lifting them in vapor,

floating them in clouds, bearing up birds, wafting ships, and so refracting and diffusing light as to make the day universal. Oxygen is a gas, but in carbon, a solid body, we also find an adaptability and proportioning no less wonderful. Now we see it in its purity, the most precious known ornament; now, stored in huge black masses, as fuel for the nations; now spouting up as a constituent of the oil that gives us light; now floating in the atmosphere and diffused in the earth, so as to be absorbed by vegetables and form their main constituent, thus giving us trees for fruit, leaves for shade, wood for fuel, and timber for houses and ships.

If now we reflect that what is here said of these two substances is applicable in a measure, if not equally, to all others, we shall see that not only in the adjustment of law to law and of force to force have we evidence of a contriving mind that lay back of them, but also that we have evidence of precisely the same kind for an originating mind that lay back of the material which those laws control.

Of the admirable papers on "The Unity of Nature," the most noticeable are those on the moral character of man regarded as an exception to that unity. And here again there may be a question whether the true relation of personality in Nature is reached. It may be that if it were, the apparent exception would be merged in a higher unity.

A unity differs from a unit. That can have no unity. A unity is the result of parts so related that they conspire to form a whole. This whole may be a part of a still greater whole and go to form its unity. Thus the eye is a unity in itself, at the same time that it goes in as a part to form the unity of the body. There may, therefore, be as many unities in the body as there are separate organs. Each muscle is a separate unity, so is a leaf, so is a tree, so is the earth as composed of different strata, so is the planetary system, so are the starry heavens, so is the universe. But while a whole of some kind is thus implied in a unity, the whole in one case may be of a different kind from that in another. It may be a whole of mere aggregation, as in a rock; or of contrivance, as in a machine; or of movement, as among the planets; or of effect, as in a combination of colors or of sounds: and anything so connected with such whole as to be



out of harmony with its constitutive idea would be an exception to its unity.

Now it will be seen that the whole had in view by the Duke when he speaks of the moral character of man and his consequent development downwards as an exception to the unity of Nature is not the whole of Nature, but the whole of organized Nature. He has in view the action of each organ and tendency within separate organisms, and of individuals as going to make up distinct species. "All this," he says, "is in conformity with an absolute and universal law in virtue of which there is established a perfect unity between these three things: first, the physical powers and structure of all living creatures; secondly, those dispositions and instinctive appetites which are seated in that structure to impel and guide its powers; and thirdly, the external conditions in which the creature's life is passed, and in which its faculties find an appropriate field of exercise." He goes on to say that "If man has any place in the unities of Nature this law must prevail with him;" and then to show that in regard to his moral nature or instinct it does not prevail, "There is," he says, "no difficulty in seeing the place which this instinct holds in the unity of Nature. It belongs to that class of gifts, universal in the world, which enable all living things to fulfil their part in the order of Nature, and to discharge the functions which belong to it. It is when we pass from a review of those instincts and powers with which man has been endowed to a review of their actual working and results that we, for the first time, encounter facts which are wholly exceptional, and which it is, accordingly, most difficult to reconcile with the unities of Nature." Among these facts he mentions the cruel treatment of women, to which there is nothing analogous among beasts, and which necessarily tends to the degradation of the race. He mentions also polyandry, infanticide, cannibalism, deliberate cruelty, systematic slaughter connected with warlike passions or with religious customs. He then says, in his sixth paper, "It is indeed impossible to look abroad either upon the past history or upon the existing condition of mankind, whether savage or civilized, without seeing that it presents phenomena which are strange and monstrous—incapable of being reduced within the harmony of things or reconciled with the unity of

Nature. The contrasts which it presents to the general laws and course of Nature cannot be stated too broadly. There is nothing like it in the world. It is an element of confusion amidst universal order." He says again of these habits and practices that "they stand before us as unquestionable exceptions to the unity of Nature, and as conspicuous violations of the general harmony of creation."

If, now, we regard organized Nature as the whole of Nature, and look only at the action of each tendency and organ within particular organisms, and, as a general thing, at the relation of individuals within each species, we shall find what is said of the moral character of man, and of the practices growing out of its perversion as an exception to the unity of Nature, to be not only true and able, but also of special interest in its bearing on subjects now warmly discussed. He insists, for example, on the fact of a development downwards. This is a great fact, and its possibility is implied in the possession of powers that render possible a development upward. That such development has taken place, not only, as is patent, in individuals, but in communities and races, is conclusively shown. It may, indeed, be questioned whether history will justify us in affirming any law of progress for the race as a whole that will carry it, in its present moral state, up to a point of civilization at all equal to its unperverted capabilities, or that can be permanently maintained. And not only is it shown that there is development downwards, but also that the savage state has been reached by such development. Those who hold that man was developed from below also hold that primeval man was a savage, and that as we recede towards the point of his origin his savage characteristics become more pronounced. But since the anomalous and destructive practices mentioned above are most prevalent among savages, and not at all among the animals from which man is supposed to have been developed, it will follow that the more nearly he should approach them the more free he would be from such practices. Since then man is by these practices degraded below the brutes, it will follow, even on the supposition of his animal origin, that he could not have been originally a savage.

The above views in regard to primeval man, and man as a

savage, are of much interest. They rest on their own basis, and can be affected by nothing that may be said in connection with a wider view of Nature. Such wider view there is. Organic nature is not the whole of Nature, and if we take Nature as a whole we cannot assent to the assertion of the Duke that there is in it "universal order," or any "general harmony of creation" that has not its discords. On the other hand we say (1) that there are in Nature appearances of disorder as great as those in man himself, and (2) that the appearances of disorder in Nature correspond with those in man in a remarkable degree.

"The earth, our habitation," says Bishop Butler, "has the appearances of being a ruin." No one can look upon its surface without seeing that its present state must have been the result of forces that have not acted harmoniously, but with violence and convulsion. We look upon a sea of mountains. Was it that the earth was once fluid, and was tossed, as the ocean with a tempest, and suddenly congealed? Was it that the surface was once even and these masses were upheaved from the centre? In either case who can conceive of the violence and struggle of those agencies by which such effects were produced? Here we see the sides of the cleft mountain and find the strata not only upheaved, but contorted and deflexed. On the very tops of the mountains the rocks testify of the force of ocean currents and of the grinding power of the iceberg. Nor does it appear that these forces have yet reached a point of stable equilibrium. There are volcanoes, and earthquakes, and typhoons, and on the land the desolated path of the whirlwind. Is it said that the original convulsions worked towards the fitting up of a habitation for man? Yes, but what a habitation? Certainly not such a one as would have been the product of love and skill careful for the wants of those towards whom no displeasure ever had been, or would be, manifested. We would not be ungrateful, but it must be said that large portions of the earth yield their products reluctantly, scantily, and only to the hand of toil, so that for the many life is so far a struggle for mere existence as to dwarf them both physically and intellectually. Climates are extreme. There are noxious and pestilential elements. There are serpents that hiss, and wild beasts that devour. There are locusts, and caterpillars, and mildew, and blight, and frosts by which Nature

destroys in a night millions of fruit-buds which she had been months in forming. Is there unity in that?

That the race generally have believed that there is in Nature disorder and a want of unity is testified by their mythologies. Hence the Ahriman of Persia; hence the Typhon of Egypt, "who tears his mother's side at the moment she is giving him birth, and is afterwards united to Nephthys, that is, perfection, or consummate beauty, thus producing the mixture of good and evil which is, as it were, the essence of this world." Hence the essential evil connected with matter in the system of Plato, and the Demiurgus of the Gnostics. Hence, too, the giants and dwarfs in the mythology of the Scandinavians. Nor is the difficulty removed by any explanations or discoveries of modern philosophy. If they show, as they do, that in the conflicts of the elements evil is removed, it is yet involved that there was evil to be removed. Does the storm purify the atmosphere? Then the atmosphere needed to be purified. Such explanations only show that God has confined evil within such limits that it shall not be destructive of the system; and also discover the wisdom of those means which he has taken thus to limit it. If, in the human system, an attack of the gout prevents a fever that would be fatal, that does not show that the gout is not an evil. No, the truth is that in connection with the order and beneficence of the system there is also disorder and misery, and these are so inwrought and intermingled that both optimism and pessimism are possible.

And not only is there disorder in Nature, and an apparent want of unity and of harmony, but, as has been said, these correspond remarkably to the same things in man. The extent and minuteness of this correspondence between Nature and the human mind, whether on the side of order or of disorder, may be seen if we observe how that part of language originates which is employed to express the affections of the mind. It is a received doctrine among men learned in this department that all such words had first a meaning purely physical, and that this meaning was afterwards transferred to express some affection of the mind analogous to the physical condition or act. Whether this be strictly and universally true or not, it certainly is true that the great mass of words of this description are thus formed;

and if so, then it will follow that for every mental state, act, or affection which we can express in words there must be some analogous state, act, or affection in the physical world or in the animal creation; for if we look at the different species of animals we find no unity unless from that relation by which one preys upon another. Thus, referring to Nature, Shakespeare says in Richard III., "O, then began the tempest of my soul." Again in Richard II., "This lowering tempest of your home-bred hate." In Hamlet we have three words in one line to express a single mental affection: "In the very torrent, tempest, and as I may say whirlwind of passion." So, to refer to animals, he says, in King Lear, "Hog in sloth, fox in stealth, wolf in greediness, dog in madness, lion in prey." Quotations of this kind might be multiplied indefinitely. But this could not be if there were not in Nature disorder and want of unity corresponding to those in man.

Is there then no unity in Nature as a whole? So far as human sagacity, unaided by revelation, has been able to discover, we say no. Taken as a whole it neither realizes nor tends towards any one result to such a degree that we can find its unity in relation to that. Certainly it is not as well adapted as it might be to produce happiness; much less is it as well adapted as it might be to produce misery. There is in it a strange blending of elements and tendencies and results that has always caused it to be a mystery and enigma unsolvable by man.

But if we turn to revelation we find that the end of Nature is not within itself, and therefore that its unity must be from its relation to something out of, beyond, or above itself. Viewed in the light of revelation this marvellous system of materials which we call matter, and of uniformities which we call laws, originated we know not when, upheld we know not how, is but a temporary scaffolding erected with reference to a permanent building that is now going up. "They shall all," says the Scripture, "wax old as doth a garment, and as a vesture shalt Thou fold them up, and they shall be changed." Viewing Nature thus as a scaffolding, we shall see that there is in it a perfect adaptation to the end in view, and that it is by its very want of unity within itself that it is fitted to become a part of a higher unity. It is the uniformities which constitute it a Nature, and



the necessity and perfection of these, not only for the education of such a being as man, but as a condition for his responsibility, will not be questioned. Each of these uniformities has unity within itself, but in order to become a part of a higher unity it was necessary that there should be in the whole a perfect correspondence between it and the moral state of man. Such a correspondence there is, and this it is that causes it to be what the Scriptures reveal it to be, a fit place for the temporary residence of such a being as man in a state of probation under a remedial system. The unity of Nature will then be found, not in any harmony within the system itself, but in its fitness to speak to man of both "the goodness and the severity of God"—to be an emblem of the stability of Moral Law, and of the certainty of retribution, whether for good or for evil, under its administration. Vast as the system of Nature is, we find its chief significance and value in its relation to a higher and vaster system in which we find personality and Moral Law.

While, therefore, we have a very high estimate of both the ability and value of "The Reign of Law," and of each of the papers on the "Unity of Nature," we yet feel that in their total effect they do not present truly the relation of personality to Natural Law. By the term Law two things wholly distinct are signified. In the one case it signifies a uniformity, or a set of uniformities, and implies a force by which the uniformity is produced. The rule in accordance with which the force acts may or may not be known, but in either case there is no freedom of choice in the subject of the law. There is, under given conditions, a uniform, necessitated movement, and that is all. Disobedience to the law by the subject of it is impossible, and, of course, there is no responsibility, or reward, or punishment. These uniformities, uniformities of succession and of structure, are the basis of natural science. They constitute its domain. Their certainty is the ground, and the whole ground, of its certainty. In the other sense of the word Law, and especially if it be Moral Law, it signifies a command addressed to intelligent and free beings that can be obeyed or disobeyed, and that has connected with it rewards and punishments. Between these the analogy is so slight that it seems unfortunate they should both be called by the same name. We here come into the re-

gion of personality, and our ground of certainty in regard to anything future is wholly different. It is not science, but confidence in character. We come into the region of Moral Law. This it is that addresses itself to man as man. With the system of uniformities which we call Nature, man, as a moral being, has not, necessarily, anything to do. His great interests lie outside of and beyond it. Moral Law is paramount, and may require him, as in martyrdom, to renounce whatever good it is capable of conferring, or to defy whatever evil it can inflict. This law is among those things in this universe that "cannot be shaken," and must remain. Surely, then, we might have expected that in a work entitled "The Reign of Law" Moral Law would at least be mentioned. But no; it is not even among the definitions, and then, tho evidently not so intended, the whole trend of the discussions is towards the undue extension of natural law. We feel that Nature is not made as subordinate as it should be, and that personality and freedom do not have their proper place. Let Natural law have its own domain, and, during its appointed time, bring round its cycles, but, except as subordinate and temporary, this system that we call Nature, this necessitated system, this round of ongoing that returns into itself, cannot justify itself, and ought not to be permanent. It can justify itself and find its unity as a part of the great whole only, and so far, as it is a condition for an end beyond itself that is worthy of such preparation. Such an end the Scriptures reveal. In its more general form this end is the glory of God, that is to say, the manifestation of his attributes. Towards this we may well believe that the whole of Nature, its disorder, not less than its order, is fitted to contribute. In its more specific form the end revealed in the Scriptures is the "new heavens and a new earth wherein dwelleth righteousness."

MARK HOPKINS.

## THE PROGRESS OF CO-OPERATION IN THE UNITED STATES.

THE history of co-operation in the United States is popularly supposed to stand in need rather of being made than of being written. Co-operation in reality antedates the Revolution, and forms an important chapter in the industrial history of the country, tho not in the "contents" of Bolles. The Massachusetts Bureau of Statistics of Labor declares (Report of 1877), that "there has been for the past twenty-five years in this State an annual investment of from \$100,000 to \$250,000 in co-operative experiments." Pennsylvania and other States have invested far more in this idea.

It is sadly true of many of these States, as of Massachusetts, that the average duration of these experiments, in production and distribution at least, has been "from about three to five years." Other chapters of co-operation tell a very different story. Through failures as through successes, co-operation has moved on until it has developed a volume of business which, if it could be accurately measured, would astonish us all. Every line of European co-operation is found among us. We can place little indeed alongside of the brilliant essays in co-operative industry which France has outwrought. The splendid success of England in co-operative distribution has not been approached, tho our record in this department is both larger and better than the latest American book on Co-operation pronounces it. We have however carried co-operative credit to an extent that fairly rivals Germany, and we have evolved an original form of co-operation, in an agricultural industry which has already assumed large proportions.

A sketch of this history is all that can as yet be written.

The data for any fuller story are to be gathered in a search which will prove no holiday task. Less than half a dozen States charge themselves through Labor Bureaus, or otherwise, with studying the interests of the wage-workers. Where the States seek to fulfil this duty they are foiled by the indifference of the co-operative societies, their reluctance to disclose their actual condition, their fear of rousing the opposition of the trade, and their suspicion of governmental scrutiny. The records of most of the early experiments live only in the memory of their survivors. Co-operation awaits its Old Mortality, piously bent on rescuing from oblivion the fading characters of these living epitaphs.

The chief entries now to be recorded in the annals of American Co-operation may be tabulated as follows :

1730 (cir.). Share system introduced into New England fisheries.

1752. Fire assurance introduced in Philadelphia.

1767. Life insurance introduced in Philadelphia.

1819. Mutual assurance bodied in a national order—The Odd Fellows.

1820-30. Owen's movement, &c.

1830-40. Loan and Building Societies formed in Philadelphia. New England Association of Farmers and Mechanics agitate the formation of stores. Labor organizations in New England open some stores.

1840-50. Brook Farm, Hopedale, etc. Fourierite Phalanxes. New England Protective Union builds up a system of stores.

1850-60. Loan Associations arise in Massachusetts. Associate Dairies started in New York. Anaheim.

1860-70. Stores started in various States. Productive Societies *do*. Revival of Building and Loan Associations in Pennsylvania. Mutual assurance assumes business forms.

1870-80. Knights of St. Crispin agitate co-operation. Founding and growth and decline of the Patrons of Husbandry. Founding and growth of the Knights of Honor. Founding and growth and dissolution of the Sovereigns of Industry. Sporadic stores in many States. Sporadic productive societies in many States. Rapid growth of Associate Dairies. Rapid growth of Mutual Assurance Companies. Rapid growth of Building and Loan Societies in Pennsylvania. Revival of Loan Associations in Massachusetts. Institution of Loan Associations in New Jersey, Ohio, California, etc. Experiments in Colonization.

1880, etc. Formation of the New England Co-operative Association. Revival of the Patrons of Husbandry. Continued growth of Co-operation in all lines. Development of The Knights of Labor. Organization of the Central Labor Union.

It is proposed now to fill out somewhat this bare outline of the story of co-operative production and co-operative credit.

#### I. CO-OPERATIVE PRODUCTION.

(1) *Co-operative Fisheries, etc.*—The Puritan settlements had given a practical training in the spirit of co-operation, and in “the first industry that demanded congregation of labor and aggregation of wealth” the form of co-operation followed. The share system was introduced into the cod and mackerel fisheries, and into whaling, somewhere about 1730. It has continued more or less in use ever since. The merchants in the China trade also identified the interests of their men with their own by a percentage on the profits of each voyage.

(2) *Co-operative Agriculture.*—The first wave of enthusiasm over co-operation rose and fell in the decade 1820–30, under the inspiration of Robert Owen and his famous experiment in New Harmony. Eleven societies are known to have been founded during this epoch. Of these Indiana had four, New York three, Ohio two, Pennsylvania one, and Tennessee one. Their membership ranged from 15 to 900, and the land employed from 120 acres to 30,000 acres. They lasted from three months to three years. These societies were for the most part communistic rather than co-operative.

In the decade 1840–50 came a remarkable movement, the result of the social stir of transcendentalism, quickened by the Fourierite propaganda carried on through the New York *Tribune*. Brook Farm (1841–47), the child of Unitarianism, Hope-dale (1841–57), the child of Universalism, and the Fourierite Phalanxes (1843–47), were true co-operative societies, and were based on agriculture. A few attempted additional industries. Most of them, however, tried nothing but farming, over which “they went mad.” For a while a new era seemed opening upon the country, and the good time coming to be looming round the corner. But from a variety of causes beyond their too exclusive devotion to farming, from unwise choice of location, insufficient capital, lax admission of members, etc., all these societies ultimately failed, and most of them without any long agony of hope deferred. But even the memory of some is an inspiration. There were some thirty of the Fourierite Phalanxes, of which Ohio had eight, New York six, Pennsylvania



six, Massachusetts three, Illinois three, New Jersey two, Michigan two, Wisconsin one, Indiana one, and Iowa one. They represented from 20 to 450 members, and from 200 to 2394 acres. They continued in existence from five months to twelve years, all but one lasting less than five years and most of them less than half that time.

The next decade witnessed a striking example of successful colonization. Anaheim (1857, etc.), in Los Angeles County, California, was founded by a company of fifty poor Germans of San Francisco, among whom there was not one farmer. They bought a tract of over 1000 acres, and wisely placed its care in the hands of the judicious originator of the enterprise. He laid it out in 50 twenty-acre lots and 50 small village lots, reserving a number of acres for public purposes; stocked the farms with vines, and cultivated them by hired hands, while the members of the company pursued their city trades. At the end of three years the colony settled upon the estate, distributing the allotments equitably, when the settlement passed into the usual village form, in which it continues to prosper. In the following decades (1860-80) there were scattered attempts to introduce co-operation into farming, accurate accounts of most of which are not at hand. One of the most interesting of these experiments was the Kansas Co-operative Farm, or Silkville, as it was later called, from its chief industry. It was founded by a Frenchman, the Marquis de Boissiere. He purchased 3000 acres, near Williamsburgh, in Franklin County, in 1869, on which were a large peach orchard, 400 apple trees, a vineyard of 1200 young grapevines, and 10,000 mulberry trees. In 1873 the estate was sufficiently well in hand and the plans matured enough to invite co-operation, in a circular which outlined an attractive and varied industrial community, embodying among many of the ideas of Fourier, "a combined household." In 1875 the building for this household, accommodating from 80 to 100 persons, was completed, having among its attractions a library of 1200 volumes in English, besides a large number of French and other continental works. The population has ranged from about 30 to 40 persons, children included, and the work has covered farming, stock-raising, fruit-growing, dairying, and silk culture. It had achieved "a substantial success" in 1878. The distance of

the settlement from any large market has hindered its growth. It is still in existence under the original ownership, but how far the co-operative features have been continued its manager does not write.

The rapid development of huge farms has drawn attention, of late, to the need of combination on the part of small farmers, and co-operative farming has been much discussed in the West. Some colonies of immigrants have been planted, in which co-operation was partially developed. The most notable of these, Rugby, has been a sad failure, as was not unexpected by those who knew the soil of the Cumberland plateau. During the latter part of the "hard times" of 1870-80, various attempts were made to organize the transfer of labor from the overcrowded centres of the East to the lands of the South and West, in co-operative colonies. The Co-operative Colony Aid Association of New York planted one colony in Kansas, which was broken up by the universal drouth of 1880. The return of prosperity, in rendering this form of philanthropy unnecessary, made it impracticable as a combination of capital and labor. An organization of workingmen is still essaying this work in New York, and has founded one colony, Eglinton, in Taney County, Missouri.

The Patrons of Husbandry, a national organization for the spread of co-operation among farmers, made some experiments in co-operative colonies. The Sovereigns of Industry, a national order for the spread of co-operation among all classes (lawyers excepted), also had this subject under consideration, but no action seems to have been taken. The successful settlements of the Shakers, etc., are communistic, and hence are not further noticed here.

Co-operation has, however, had an immense success, on a purely business basis, in the cheese factories and creameries of the Associate Dairies. In 1851 a young dairy farmer of Western New York, on setting up for himself, proposed to his father, a skilled cheese-maker, to deliver milk daily to him for manufacture into cheeses. The plan worked so well that the neighbors joined and built a factory. The great economy of the system, and the excellence of the cheeses produced under this division of labor, led to other factories. Their growth was slow at first

and for some time confined to New York. By 1866, however, there were 500 in that State alone, averaging 400 cows, aggregating 200,000 cows, worth \$8,000,000, and employing 1,000,000 acres, worth \$40,000,000. In 1870 there were 1313 cheese factories in the whole country, using 116,466,405 gallons of milk, and producing \$16,760,569 in cheeses. The same methods were introduced into butter-making in 1861, in Orange County, New York, and, under the name of "creameries" butter factories have multiplied rapidly. It is estimated that there are to-day 5000 of these co-operative factories in the United States.

To this system is chiefly due the immense impetus given to our dairy production. Mulhall's Balance Sheet of the World (1881) presents the United States as having the largest number of cows of any country, a little over one third of all Europe, viz., 33,500,000 cows. Of these 5,600,000 are for slaughter, leaving 27,900,000 for dairy products. We exported in 1881 nearly \$23,000,000 of dairy products, two thirds of the value of our total product forty years ago.

(3) *Co-operative Manufactures*.—This most difficult form of co-operation has received comparatively little development among us. A considerable number of scattered experiments have been made within the last thirty years, but few have won lasting success. Among the earlier essays may be mentioned a tailors' association in Boston (1849), ship-yards in Baltimore (1865) and in Boston (1866), a machine-shop in Philadelphia (1866); foundries in various cities—Troy, Albany, Cleveland, Cincinnati, St. Louis (1865–68); shoe manufactories in Lynn and North Adams, Mass. (*cir.* 1868); a cigar manufactory in Westfield, Mass. (1869); a machine-shop in Greenfield, Mass. (1870), etc. The most promising of these early experiments was the stove-foundry of the Iron Moulders' International Union. This was started in 1867, in Alleghany County, Pa., the 10,000 members of the Union being expected to become stock-holders. The paid up capital however proved insufficient in a critical moment—the oft-repeated experience—and the enterprise failed.

The decade 1870–80 experienced a marked increase in the number of productive societies. In the mid-year of this decade, Massachusetts had sixteen productive societies reporting to the State, and nine not reporting, though duly chartered. All but

one of these had been organized since 1870. The sixteen societies reporting gave an aggregate paid-in capital of \$114,210. The nine not reporting were incorporated for \$47,110. Other societies were known to exist. These societies were located in Lowell, Truro, Weymouth, Westborough, Chelmsford, East Templeton, Holyoke, Somerset, North Adams, Newburyport, Orange, Marlborough (2), Boston (2), Stoneham (3), Fall River (4), Lynn (4), Westfield (8). Their work may be classified as follows : furniture-making (1), chair-making (1), foundry-work (1), manufacture of gas (1), dairy-work (1), cotton-manufacturing (1), printing (2), the building of houses (4), cigar-making (5), boot and shoe manufacture (9). An illustration of their work may be taken at random in the Co-operative Furniture Company of Orange, which in 1879 sold chamber sets to the value of \$15,743.52. A very promising association was the Rochdale Cotton Manufacturing Association of Fall River, organized in 1874 with a share subscription of \$125,000. This was the work of a philanthropic mill-owner, whose family took the largest amount of the stock. It had a short career. Ohio had a number of associations for manufacturing, but the co-operative feature did not long survive in the few societies that were successful. One of these associations had a capital in 1877 of \$100,000, but lapsed into a joint-stock concern, votes counting not by persons, but by shares.

It is timely now to recall the fact that a number of these societies were the results of strikes. The strike at North Adams, *e.g.*—on the introduction of Chinese labor—led to the establishment of a co-operative shoe-factory. A report says : “The men speak with pride of their new feelings of self-reliance and freedom, as well as of the quality of their work.” Would that our present labor revolts might revive this “more excellent way” of striking! The Patrons of Husbandry were reported in the *Economist* of Nov. 8, 1876, as having “thirty (30) manufacturing associations, whose capital ranges from \$200,000 to \$500,000 . . . ; sixteen (16) grist mills, one of which produces one hundred barrels of flour per day . . . ; three (3) tanneries, and six (6) smitheries.”

The Sovereigns of Industry contemplated entering upon this field, and made some essays in it : *e.g.*, the Kingston Co-operative Foundry Company, in Kingston, Mass. Its members consisted

chiefly of picked men from other foundries. It organized with a capital of \$8000. Details of the experience of this and other societies have vanished with the Order. It is a pity that our reformers are so intent to "live the epic" that they wholly neglect "to write it." The latest labor organization, the Knights of Labor, has among its aims "the establishment of co-operative institutions, productive and distributive." It is encouraging to note that this Order seeks "the substitution of arbitration for strikes." In New York City a number of attempts have been made in different branches of industry. A printers' co-operative association started in 1867 with a capital of \$5000. In May, 1870, its business had grown so much that it leased a large building in Beekman Street and increased its capital. The presses, types, and other material in the office were then worth \$30,000, and the establishment employed fifty workmen.

Perhaps the most notable success has been achieved by one of the earliest of our productive societies. The Somerset Co-operative Foundry was organized in 1867 for the manufacture of stoves and hollow ware. Works belonging to a company that had been out of business for two or three years were purchased for \$6500. Shares were placed at \$100, and the stock at \$15,000. In the outset 109 shares were taken, in numbers varying from one to five. At first only half a dozen men could be supplied with work. In a few months a change of management became necessary, and the year closed with a small loss. At the end of the second year a dividend of  $13\frac{1}{2}$  per cent was declared. The third year made about the same dividend. In 1871 229 shares were reported as held by forty-two persons, in numbers varying from one to ten, the latter being the maximum allowed. Twenty-five stockholders were at work, and six others had been employed at different times. Of the remaining eleven, some were in business for themselves, some were in good positions under other employers, and a few were not practical workmen. All but a half dozen of the members were married, and all but two were Americans. Wages ranged from \$50 to \$125 a month. They were better than in other establishments. The agent was paid \$100 a month. He had experience as a practical workman and in general business. The money gain to some of the men had in 1871 amounted to from \$300 to \$500 more



than they would have received in the ordinary way of working. All dividends were allowed to accrue to the working capital, at least up to 1871. The business done in that year amounted to \$60,000. By 1876 the association had added \$30,000 to the surplus fund, and had paid out \$14,600 in dividends. At that date its stockholders numbered fifty-three, of whom twenty-nine worked for the company. This society is still in prosperous existence. It reported for 1881 a paid-up capital of \$30,000, with reserves of \$16,524. The secret of this fine success is probably given in a report to the State Bureau of Labor: "In the earlier stages of the enterprise a great deal of self-denial had to be practised, but a willingness was shown to submit to any personal annoyance rather than allow the concern to suffer embarrassment."

New experiments are being reported continually. Chicago has lately started a harness-makers' association, and a furniture-makers' society. The co-operative furniture manufactory of St. Louis employs 110 workmen, and claims to do one of the largest businesses of this kind in the city.

There have been a number of experiments in industrial partnership; notably the Pacific Mills of Lawrence, Massachusetts, and the Millville glass-works, New Jersey. One of the latest is that of the Peacedale Manufacturing Company, Rhode Island. At the beginning of 1878 the Messrs. Hazard laid before their employes a scheme whereby, in addition to the regular wages, the hands should receive a *pro-rata* share in the profits accruing after interest and profit on capital had been provided. The firm were to fix this percentage. The plan has been working with partial success. The first year there were no dividends to the hands. The second year a dividend of 5 per cent on the gross wages was declared, amounting to \$5,842.40. The third year a dividend of 5 per cent was made, aggregating \$5999.65. The fourth year (1881) the high price of wool cut down profits, and a dividend of 3 per cent, or \$3760.14, was ordered. The co-operative plan continues in use for the present year, since the firm can report: "We believe we can see an increase of care and diligence. As yet this increase is not as great as it should be; but the object to be attained in preventing waste and in encouraging conscientious work is so important to the moral as

well as to the material good of the community, that we decide to persevere." In a letter, Mr. Rowland Hazard writes: "Results are not brilliant, but I think its good effects are somewhat analogous to those of a lightning-rod. . . . If by careful observations we can see that it reduces the tendency to violent explosions, we should be satisfied."

## II. CO-OPERATIVE CREDIT.

(1) *Co-operative Banking*.—Of banks proper there appear to have been few. The Grangers, in their palmy days, established a number of co-operative banks in different States, some of which were, from time to time, reported to be doing a large business. Five (5) banks were reported by the *Economist* (Nov. 8, 1876), one of which had a capital of \$500,000. The Bank Commissioner of California (1882) reports the Grangers' Bank of California, in San Francisco (incorporated April 24, 1874), as having a capital stock subscribed of \$1,000,000, of which \$531,200 are paid in, in 10,000 shares, with total resources of \$1,917,577.06, covering all its liabilities. This showing places it seventh in the list of California banks as to capital, etc.

The Farmers' Co-operative Trust Company of Cochranon, Crawford County, Pennsylvania, is perhaps the latest experiment in this line, being scarcely a year old. It divides its profits into three equal shares, one third going to the stockholders, one third to the depositors of money, and one third to the borrowers, *pro rata* to the stock held, the deposits made, or the loans drawn.

(2) *Loan and Building Associations*.—Co-operative banking with us has taken the form of associations for the mutual loaning and borrowing of savings, and this chiefly with reference to the building of homes. These associations seem to have originated in Philadelphia. The earliest traced was the Oxford Provident Building Association (Jan. 3, 1831). The earlier societies appear to have gone out of existence, or to have merged in newer organizations. All the associations reporting to the State in 1880 date since 1866. The earliest experiments in this line of which we have accurate data were in Massachusetts. In 1852 The Suffolk Mutual Loan and Accumulating Fund Association of Boston was organized. It was followed by nine similar societies

in 1853, and by sixteen in 1854, when an act of the Legislature was obtained to facilitate the incorporation of such associations. In 1857 these societies had become of sufficient promise to call for special reports from the State Insurance Commissioners. The report for 1859 showed 36 associations in existence, which had made an aggregate of loans since their commencement of \$3,113,808.16; of which interest was charged on \$1,344,407.22. These societies were run at an average expense of \$524.39 per annum. Their term of prosperity was brief. The report of 1864 gives 22 as then working; that of '65 records eight; and that of '66 can only show three. The trouble seems to have lain in certain serious defects of their organization, heightened by the strain of the civil war. To this latter cause indeed is probably due the obliteration of a large portion of the societies of different kinds which were in existence at its opening. The experiments, however, were not thrown away, since, in the language of the commissioners "they have demonstrated beyond doubt that, with equal prudence and intelligence on the part of the lender, loans to the industrious and economical poor are as safe as those made to any class whatever of the rich." After the civil war a remarkable revival of these societies began in Philadelphia, and extended through Pennsylvania. The earliest organization recorded in the State archives was The Miletown, No. 5 (March, 1866), and The Bristol, of Bucks Co. (Dec. 1866). These were followed in 1867 by The Falls of Schuylkill, of Philadelphia, in January; The German, of Lycoming Co., in April; The Tremont Saving Fund Association, of Schuylkill Co., in June. Five societies followed in 1868, and four in 1869. These societies are still in operation. The growth of these societies through the decade 1870-80 was astonishing. They now number about 600 in Philadelphia alone, with a membership of 75,000, and a capital of \$80,000,000. In the State of Pennsylvania there are registered (1880) 1017 associations. The total number in the State is variously estimated from 1500 to 1800. From the data gathered it can be said that they represent capital ranging from \$10,000 to \$300,000, and net earnings (1880) reaching from \$20 (The Third Ward of Alleghany Co., org. Sept. 1880) to \$106,885.60 (The Enterprise Saving Fund and Loan Association, of Phila.). Ten report earnings (1880) under

\$1000; twenty-seven from \$1000 to \$5000; eleven from \$5000 to \$10,000; forty-three from \$10,000 to \$25,000; twenty-three from \$25,000 to \$50,000; five from \$50,000 to \$75,000; one over \$75,000; and one over \$100,000. It can be justly claimed, officially, that they have "become an important factor in the financial and industrial progress of the commonwealth." For the same official source adds: "From their inception up to the present it is estimated that under their operations 60,000 comfortable houses have been erected in Philadelphia alone, and that they have enabled 25,000 householders to pay off mortgages that probably would otherwise have been foreclosed. Through the economical habits they were instrumental in forming, it is estimated that \$100,000,000 have been invested within the city limits, which, were it not for them, might possibly have been squandered in dissipation and by improvidence. They have been the means of making 80,000 owners of real estate and 80,000 tax-payers; thus giving Philadelphia the pre-eminent title of being the 'city of homes'" (Report of Secretary of Internal Affairs, Pa., 1879-80, pp. 266, 269). A very gratifying feature of these associations has been the fidelity with which they have been managed. "Hundreds of associations have been conducted from their inception to their termination without the loss of a dollar" (Ib., p. 268). The movement has now its organ in Philadelphia—*The Building Association Journal*.

Ohio followed Pennsylvania closely in this development. In Clark County several such associations were formed soon after the war. The Clark County Mutual Benefit Association (1868) ran six years with fair success. The Springfield Loan and Savings Association (1869) continued until 1875 with a moderate success. Other societies followed, all of which were patterned upon the Philadelphia plan. A considerable development of these societies has taken place latterly in Ohio, especially in Cincinnati. It is claimed that there are 174 associations in Cincinnati, with a membership of 28,000. The Golden Rule Aid Company of Clark Co. (org. 1880) claims that, within three years, societies of this pattern have been organized in fifteen counties of the State, which have paid in full for homes for their patrons to the amount of \$91,700, and have placed loan shareholders in possession of homes, paid for in full and on which

they are now making monthly payments, to the amount of \$168,750, and have a subscription for loan shares amounting to over \$607,000. The Bureau of Labor Statistics (1880) records the incorporation of 307 associations during the seven years preceding this report, with a capital of \$154,658,716. "Numbers of these however never commenced business." Thirteen societies returned receipts and disbursements for the preceding year amounting to \$316,775.65, and assets, in 11 societies, aggregating \$624,755.54. A gain of over 38 per cent on each share was reported. Under the guidance of Hon. Josiah Quincy, Massachusetts has revived her early efforts in this direction, following now the Philadelphia plan. Four building associations were reported to the State in 1875. An act of the Legislature to further the formation of such societies was obtained, and in July, 1877, The Pioneer Co-operative Saving Fund and Loan Association was incorporated, with 177 members, representing 795 shares. Its fifth annual statement (April 3, 1882) shows 819 members, 4178 shares of stock, a cash business of \$90,000, assets of \$112,528.98, with profits of \$12,763.98. Other associations arose. There are now twenty-two societies incorporated, having a total membership of over 6000, representing 40,000 shares, with an ultimate value of \$8,000,000. "The assets of the associations have risen during the year from \$372,461.31 to \$653,142.80, which indicates a marked degree of prosperity" (Bank Commissioner's Report, Jan., 1882).

New Jersey reported 106 associations in 1880. Of these only 51 returned statistics. These 51 have been in existence from one to fourteen years. They report an aggregate of 46,869 shares, held among 6310 persons. Their office expenses summed up \$11,527.11. Net assets were given at \$4,002,647.70; net gains at \$1,097,260.79. California returns 16 societies, of which 11 reporting show 29,947 shares, a paid-in capital of \$1,808,304.98, earnings of \$787,183.62, and assets of \$2,595,488.48. Similar associations are known to be in operation in Maine (one reported by the Bank Examiner), New Hampshire, Rhode Island, Delaware, District of Columbia, Virginia, West Virginia, Kentucky, Illinois (ten or twelve in Chicago), and Michigan. The Bureau of Statistics of Labor and Industries of New Jersey (1880) makes the following conjectural estimate of the development of these



societies: "We have said that there are probably 2000 building and loan associations in the State of Pennsylvania. If there are 1000 in all the other States, which is less than others have estimated it, the total would be about 3000 in the country. It is safe to say that the average membership would be 150, and the total 450,000. Applying the average of five persons interested in each, as in the case of the savings-banks, and we have a total of 2,250,000." A private authority on the subject writes that it is a safe estimate to figure the average capital of these associations at \$25,000. This would aggregate a capital of \$75,000,000. New York has a unique form of co-operation, of the joint-stock kind, for home building, known as The Hubert Home Club. Messrs. Hubert, Pirsson & Co., architects, designed ingenious plans for apartment houses, and elaborated a system whereby a small number of persons could combine to erect such a building and become its co-proprietors, with great economy of cost. Within two years from the issue of the prospectus, six of these Home Clubs have been formed, and have erected or are now erecting large buildings in first-class locations. Several other companies are forming. The capital engaged in these enterprises is about \$5,000,000. The idea has not yet been taken up by working-men, though it admits of application, to people of small means.

Building and loan associations in the language of the Pennsylvania Report quoted above, "supply a want that no other savings institution or banking company can meet." Their development, one of the most marked successes of co-operation, is an encouraging sign of the education of Labor in our country in that co-work for a commonwealth which is the ideal towards which society is moving—

"Till each man finds his own in all men's good,  
And all men work in noble brotherhood."

R. HEBER NEWTON.

## THE DAWN OF THE ENGLISH REFORMATION.

THE English Reformation of Religion, as exhibited in the formularies, the ritual, and the government of the Anglican Church, is so utterly unlike the movement in any other European country that people have been greatly puzzled as to the causes which brought it about, as to the shape which it has permanently assumed, and as to the reactions which have constantly occurred in its history. It is a reformed church, but it has the outward mechanism of the old faith, its two arch-bishops with nicely graded distinctions of rank, its capitular hierarchy of deans, archdeacons, and canons, its parochial system, and its rural hierarchy too. In one sense its forms are more ancient than the organization of the papacy, in another it dates from the marriage of Henry with Anne Boleyn, or the Restoration of Charles, or the Revolution of 1688. With some publicists it is the outcome of Henry's wilfulness and of Thomas Cromwell's cunning. With others it is the vast effort of the reformers of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, and of the prelates and statesmen who surrounded the young Edward's throne. With a third party it is the result of Elizabeth's compromises between the old and new faith. With a fourth it is the product of the reaction which the Restoration represented, tempered by the second reaction of the Revolution. All these critics are right, and all are wrong. The Anglican Church is at once a political and a social institution. It is the weakest social organization that has ever been known, for it is, and it has been for four centuries and more, a compromise between divergent opinions. It is a very powerful political organization, for it has always hitherto been able to enlist the interests of every government on its side.

None of those who have studied the history of the English

Church since the first successful attack was made on the foreign influences which once dominated it, and were resisted with greater or less success from the beginning, have been able to bridge over, by the light of contemporary opinion, the history of the Anglican Church from the days of Wiclif to those in which the double forces of the English reformation were indeed to some extent harmonious, but in most particulars so divergent that the parties who were distinctly bent on the same end saw no means of reaching that end but by destroying each other. To prevent this savage duel of reformed opinion was the work of English statesmen from the days of Henry the Eighth to those of William the Third; nay, it may be said to be the work of English statesmen now. But there is no means of discovering the character of the antagonism, unless one can discover the origin of the two streams of religious thought, can watch them when they flowed apart, can see how it fared with them when they were united, and so can detect how, when they were again rent asunder, tho still near, they had taken color from the common water of the past, and, in a way which has no parallel in the history of religious thought, are perpetually receiving, tho still apart, affluents from each of the watersheds from which, during their severance, they drew their forces. The traveller in the city of Lyons is shown the two streams which unite below the town. One is slow, the other is rapid. When their waters mix they run for a long time side by side, differing in color and in speed. In English Christianity the same facts are visible. But the slow stream sometimes gains strength and curtails the space of the rapid current. At other times they seem blended. At other times they break away from the same channel and seem to be permanently severed.

The history of the English Church, and of the causes which have given so peculiar a character to its action, are to be found in the facts of the fifteenth century. But the history of the fifteenth century has never been written. The materials are very few, the annals are very arid. Nothing has been more distasteful to the student than the miserable struggle of the English Henry and the French Charles for the throne of France, except it be the ferocious war which this quarrel roused for the English throne—a war which lasted for thirty years, the

effects of which endured for two centuries after its conclusion. And as the facts are distasteful, so the annals are jejune and meagre. The material prosperity of the English people was great, the corruption of society was universal, the force of government was always despotic when it could be, but constantly uncertain and generally unpopular. The stoutest prince dreaded popular discontent, the weakest was the sport of discontent. The administration was more disliked than the sovereign, and could only exist by intrigue. The representatives of permanent institutions—the Church, the Parliament, the Law—were the creatures of the intrigues by which they lived, and shared the odium or the contempt of the people. And the religion of the nation—for there were two sections of the people which were profoundly religious—was gradually preparing itself for the debate in which Henry and Cromwell, Edward and Cranmer, Mary and Gardiner, Elizabeth and Parker were but names on one side, as similarly Henry and Wolsey, Edward and Northumberland, Mary and Pole, Elizabeth and the deprived bishops were on the other side.

The two sides were Puritanism and Anglicanism—the one an ecumenical faith which was to pervade all Christendom, the other a local Christianity which was to heal the wounds of social order in England, but in alliance with the English state and English interests. The former was, as soon as it left its authors' hands, to be the foe or the critic of the established government; the latter was to ally with it, but to strengthen it by purifying it. The annals of the former have been written, imperfectly and unequally. The history of the latter has never been told. The former was heterodox and seditious down to the Revolution of 1688. The latter was orthodox and respectable from the beginning of its existence. The former may be fairly dated as a system from the days of Wiclif; the latter was vaguely and uncertainly present from the conquest, but became a permanent power in the fifteenth century, mainly because it squared with the public opinion of Europe. It is with the latter that I have particularly to deal, because it is in my power to give my readers a sketch of its purposes by the information which I can supply about its most competent and disinterested exponent. It will be necessary, however, to say something about the earlier

representative of the reformation, to whose teaching and influence the latter was more bitterly opposed than he was to the abuses which he assailed, tho both parties were laboring for the same end, tho laboring unconsciously.

Wicklif was the greatest Oxford man of the fourteenth century. Before he became an object of hatred to conservative churchmen he was widely popular. The Roman see was reputed to be an English enemy during the first great war with France, and Wicklif could safely denounce it. The preaching friars were the allies of the papacy, and it was patriotic to denounce them too. It was even possible to hint that the pope was heretical. It was almost pardonable, and with the Commons very praiseworthy, to suggest that the wealth of the church should assist the exigencies of the state. There were plenty of politicians who had a strong bias towards disendowment, and the disendowment of the monastic orders was the very obvious expedient of an impoverished exchequer. It is not wonderful that the man who criticises an over-wealthy clergy should connect their tenets with their character, and derive the latter from the former. That Wicklif slid into heterodoxy was natural. That his heterodoxy should be suspected in many particulars by men whom he had criticised was also natural. The Council of London, before which Wicklif was summoned, detected two hundred heresies in his published works. But the distinctive character of all Wicklif's writings is that he attacks the morals of the clergy, especially of those who were relieved by papal favor from domestic discipline, and that he disparages, as people do very naturally, the creed of those whose morals he attacks.

His followers went much further than he did. There has never, I believe, been a strong religious movement which has not enlisted on its side the sympathy of those who wish to better their material condition simultaneously with the bettering of their moral nature. It is no discredit to the movement that it allies itself with a yearning after social improvement, provided it resolutely puts before men a higher rule of duty. There is no doubt that the priests whom Wicklif organized as antagonists to the mendicant friars were at the bottom of the great insurrection of 1381, when the monarchy and the whole social system of England trembled in the balance. History tells us that the



insurgents were put down and punished, and this is what historians dwell upon. But history also tells us that the demands of the rioters were practically conceded, tho this history is seldom written. Still more rarely does history, as written, busy itself with those obscure workings which made Lollards a permanent force in the fifteenth century. But it was there, and was so great a force that it could not be put down, was an object of incessant alarm to the English hierarchy, and by its persistent action of hostility to the abuses of civil government and its antipathy to the opulence and the immorality of the church, drove the state and the church into close alliance. During the whole of the fifteenth century the heads of the Anglican Church never made a stand against any abuse, or for any righteous dealing, or even for the interests of a common Christianity.

The annals of the Lollards are obscure. But their preachers were active. I will refer to the career and fate of one who is little known. William White had been a secular priest. He abandoned his ecclesiastical condition, married, and became a preacher. For years he wandered about England, preaching when it was safe, and hiding when it was unsafe, like the non-conforming clergy of England and Scotland more than two centuries later. Nothing could have shocked the proprieties of the fifteenth century more than a married priest. In the next century, the boldest act of Luther's life was his marriage, an act which Cranmer dared not avow in his own case. Still, the liberty was legalized in Edward's reign. Now the quickest and strongest growth of Lollardy was in the eastern district, especially in Norfolk, at that time by far the richest of the English counties, because it was the principal seat of the linen and woollen manufacture. At last White was caught and consigned to the flames in Norwich at the bishop's gate—that is, in the space opposite to the cathedral close—in company with two others, William Waddon and Hugh Pye. I found in searching the archives of the Norwich Corporation that it cost four shillings and eightpence for two loads of fagots wherewith to consume these three Lollards. But the strength of the coming reformation remained in the eastern counties. For very definite reasons they set Mary Tudor on the throne. She repaid them with fire and fagot, for there were more victims in Norfolk and Suffolk

during Mary's reign than in all the rest of England. In the other parts of the country these burnings were intended to warn the wavering; in the eastern counties they were designed to extirpate the obstinate. This, then, was one stream of the English reformation which was real and enduring, altho its annals are obscure during the fifteenth century.

The English hierarchy, secular and regular, bishop and abbot, parish priest and monk, had become very deteriorate in the same epoch. The bishops were generally the younger sons of the noble families, sometimes were political adventurers, occasionally soldiers and statesmen. A few were selected for their abilities, but none for their religious zeal. If they were learned in the learning of their order—and only two such persons are recorded, Lyndwood and Pecok—they employed their abilities in compiling: the one a legal treatise on church discipline, and the other a controversial work which forms an apology for the existing order of things. The majority were courtiers and time-servers. They abandoned the care of their dioceses, and held offices at court. They left the work of Christianity to a few zealous and orthodox clergy, but much more to the wandering Lollards. They were so unpopular that they dared not go into their dioceses, or indeed leave the court. Two, who ventured among their people, were murdered in one year (1450). They owed their elevation to the faction which the weakness of Henry and the passion of Margaret formed—a faction which adhered faithfully to the fortunes of the House of Lancaster, and was proscribed at its fall. But not a single bishop followed those partisans. When the Yorkist party gained the upper hand, the prelates turned round with alacrity. When, after the victory of Wakefield, the same party suffered a temporary eclipse, they acknowledged the old monarch again. When Henry was dethroned again, they again followed the tactics of the Vicar of Bray. They changed again in 1470, and again in 1471. The archbishop of Canterbury, who had gone through all these vicissitudes of political allegiance without an effort and without a pang, betrayed the young princes to their uncle, assisted in putting Richard on the throne, and was equally facile to the victor of Bosworth, Henry the Seventh. In the great war of succession the prelates were compliant and contemptible.

One man among them was made a scapegoat. Pecok had written in defence of the practices of his order, and for a while was treated as a valuable advocate. But he had the folly to meddle on his own account with controversial politics, and communicated his political views to the Lord Mayor. This official, who was the brother of the Cannynge who built Redcliffe Church at Bristol, the most beautiful work of the fifteenth century, and afterwards became a clergyman, communicated the letter to the king and his court. The letter is lost, but it excited the gravest alarm. The Council declared that it would not sit if Pecok were among them. The bishop of Chichester was tried for heresy, degraded, and imprisoned for life. Partisans have discovered in his writings that he was a precursor of the reformation. In point of fact, he was an Erastian, who evidently held that the state should define the doctrines which the clergy and laity should accept, and he was an Arian, for he attacked the Apostles' Creed, and hinted not obscurely that he had doubts about the doctrine of the Incarnation. It is not a little singular that at a crisis like this tenets of so latter day a nature should have suggested themselves to a worldly and popular prelate of the fifteenth century.

The regular orders were worse than the secular clergy. They were luxurious and licentious. Sometimes a monastery or a nunnery got so evil a reputation for disorder and profligacy that it was necessary to suppress it. Some of the wealthiest colleges in Oxford and Cambridge owe their revenues to the vices of institutions from whose spoils they were founded or enriched. The monks intrigued incessantly for more donations, and in the fifteenth century it became a common practice to impoverish the parochial clergy by impropriating the greater part of a benefice to a monastic house. But the parochial clergy were not much better than the monks. Pluralities and non-residence were common. The vices of the parish priests were the theme of all satirists, and when the Lollards denounced the friars, the friars said that they were no worse, but rather better, than the parish parson. Benefices were heaped on unworthy persons, and Rome, which would do anything for money, granted the most scandalous licenses to those who chose to pay for them. There was hardly a dignitary in the church who had not bought his place. Remit-

tances on behalf of these traffickers in sacred things were so large that the English nation was believed to be seriously impoverished by the vast sums sent annually to Rome, and sometimes local patriotism was successfully invoked against those who were collecting, by all the devices which the Roman Church adopted, treasure for transmission to the papal court. The Lollards would have cut up the system root and branch; the orthodox and devout strove to reform, the worldly to apologize for it.

Hence flowed the second stream of the reformation. In some particulars it went on the same road with Wiclif. But in others it was bitterly opposed to him, and effected the condemnation of his doctrines at Constance. And as the Lollard movement survives in the puritan, or nonconformist, or evangelical element in the Church of England, so the orthodox reformer survives in the Anglican high-church man, the advocate of the union of western Christendom, and in the ritualist. I shall soon advert to the writer from whom I have learnt what were the temper and aims of the orthodox reformer, the prototype of Gardiner and Bonner, of what may be called the Whig element in the reformation of the sixteenth century.

There had long been a schism in the church. This schism was unlike that of an earlier period when the German emperors of the House of Swabia strove to keep the pope in check, and to revive their authority over the papal see by setting up an antipope in the person of one among their own creatures. This had never succeeded, because the rest of Europe was not content to follow the policy of the German empire, since the dignity of that empire was not accompanied by any power of coercing or even controlling public opinion in Western Europe. But now there was an internal schism in the church and of the church. Each rival pope had his court and his cardinals, and was, as far as forms went, legally or canonically elected. The traditions of the Roman see have never ventured on branding either of these lawfully elected chiefs of the Roman Church as antipopes. But the scandal was intolerable. All Europe was anxious to find a remedy, and the only remedy seemed to lie in the revival of an institution which had long been disused—a general council. Everybody was willing to tax himself for the support of the representatives of Christendom in a great parliament of church-

men. The council at last met at Constance, deposed three popes, elected a fourth, put to death John Huss and Jerome of Prague, created a revolt against ecclesiastical authority in Bohemia, whither the Oxford scholars had carried Wiclif's books and tenets, and for a time subordinated the pope to an ecclesiastical parliament. Another council, that of Basle, went beyond that of Constance—was indeed the Long Parliament of the church. But the effort was too early, and tho the doctrine that a general council was superior to the pope remained a favorite tenet with ecclesiastical reformers, and was a stock threat with those who were dissatisfied with the pope's policy and the pope's bulls, the European sovereigns were wise enough to see that it was more convenient to deal with one ecclesiastic than with a parliament of ecclesiastics, and after having finally healed the schism, were well content to allow the government of Christendom to fall back into the old groove.

The writer from whom I derive my information as to the condition of England in the middle of the fifteenth century, and particularly as to the condition of the English Church, was a well-born and fairly opulent ecclesiastic, who spent the greater part of his life at Oxford. The son and heir of a country gentleman, the nephew of the famous chief-justice who, as popular story tells us, was insulted on the bench by the king's son and vindicated the majesty of the law by committing the offender to prison, who more certainly refused to try Scrope, the archbishop of York, Thomas Gascoigne was possessed of an estate in a hamlet near Leeds, which has since become part of that great town, and is now inhabited by thirty thousand people. The young esquire went to Oxford, studied there, and entering into the church remained, except for a trifling prebend in the cathedral at Wells, an unbeneficed but very active clergyman during his whole life. When he was thirty years old he began to form a collection of extracts from the Latin fathers, and to note such events in contemporary history as seemed to him illustrative of the religious topics which attracted him, or to bear on the controversies of the time, or to appear significant of what was shortly impending. He held the office of Chancellor of Oxford several times, was plainly on terms of intimacy with people of rank, and was exceedingly outspoken about men and events. The two



great parties were not as yet sharply divided, and it appears that while his political sympathies were with the House of York, he does not declare for the principle of legitimacy, and he must have been deterred, on ecclesiastical grounds, from following those who were reputed to favor the Lollard schism.

He died in the spring of 1458, just after Pecok's condemnation. By his will he directed that all his papers should be copied out on vellum, at the expense of Sion Abbey, which, of course, he had made his residuary legatee, and that the copy should be deposited with the original papers in Sion Abbey. His orders were literally fulfilled, and the result remains in two huge folio volumes, written in double columns. He calls his work "*Liber Veritatum*," and the contents are chiefly transcripts from the Latin fathers and the schoolmen. I do not know by what fate these volumes were dropped into the library of Lincoln College, Oxford, where they have remained, as it seems, unread thoroughly till now. But I suspect that when the book was finished, Rotheram, bishop of Lincoln, the second founder of that college and a very influential person in his day, desired a sight of the good doctor's manuscript, and came to the conclusion that it had better not be seen generally. Every passage in these volumes which seems to be, or is, a comment on current events is carefully marked in the margin, and there is little doubt that these passages seemed inconvenient. No bishop in that day desired that the history of his order should be inquired into, least of all that the public should know what were the opinions of an unambitious and disinterested churchman, who felt the shortcomings of his order so deeply and spoke so plainly. He compiled his book, he tells us, in order that posterity might know what were the dangers of the days in which he lived, and what were the causes of them. Nobody has been the posterity, for the book has merely been run through by one or two antiquaries, who wished to extract what he said about Oxford, and therewith about that ambitious bishop of Chichester, the unlucky Pecok; and now, except that religious controversy never dies, least of all in England, the contents of his book are a mere fossil, except in so far as it aids the student of history in reconstructing the social conditions of England during the first half of the fifteenth century.

The interest in Gascoigne's notes and comments lies in the fact that he is an orthodox religious reformer, who entertains, if need be, a very mean opinion of individuals, from pope to curate or monk, and a very exalted opinion of what institutions and tenets might be if the former are reformed and the latter are made disciplinary. Both institution and tenet are to be defended, on authority indeed, but are confirmed by the manifest good which comes to those who accept and abide by them. And it must be observed that at this time, and for many a century after this time, men believed that divergences of opinion were evils which it is the duty of the church to denounce and of the state to repress and punish. It would be an error to imagine that the Lollard was one whit more tolerant than the Anglican, the Anglican than the Ultramontane—to use by anticipation a term of later date in the sense of the advocate of the papal policy as contrasted with that of a national church. There was no toleration in England till the epoch of the Revolution, and then it was granted grudgingly and sparingly. Every English theologian from the days of Wiclif down to the days of San-croft desired uniformity, was willing to invoke the secular arm in favor of coercion, and would have constrained private conscience to accept what authority succeeded in affirming. The charge of schism was therefore bandied about by the reformers and the maintainers of the existing order of things. Even at the epoch of the Toleration Act, no religious liberty was to be accorded to “papists and to such as deny the Trinity,” tho practically it soon became impossible to do more than ostracize the former from political employments and to ignore the latter.

The first grievance of the fifteenth-century church is the aggrandizement of the monks and the cathedral bodies at the expense of the parochial clergy. A century before, the posthumous piety of benefactors bestowed lands and lordships on the monks. But the various laws which prohibited the gift of real estate to the dead hand checked this kind of benefaction, and the growing passion for the acquisition of land, which is the social characteristic of the fifteenth century in England, interposed a further bar. The ingenuity of the monks was therefore directed towards other and new sources of gain. They sold every religious function which the priest, according to the creed

of the times, was alone empowered to grant and the layman was compelled to accept. The chapter of York determined on rebuilding or greatly enlarging the cathedral which is now the pride of that city. To obtain funds they imposed on every parochial clergyman in the diocese the duty of exacting heavy fees at the confessional. The principal officers of the church, we are told, paid enormous sums to the Roman court for election or for confirmation in their benefices. They recouped the outlay by exacting every kind of fee which they could devise from their flocks. The layman of the fifteenth century was mulcted at every turn, in life and in death. Now much of this could be borne if the tax had been paid to the parish clergy, who were occasionally men of great worth, and lived among their own people. "I know," says Gascoigne, "one rector of a single parish who in his lifetime sent to school and university, at his own cost, twenty young men. But now the endowments of the parochial clergy are transferred to the monasteries, and study languishes at the universities."

The claim made by the Roman pontiff that he should have the right to confirm or annul all elections to ecclesiastical office, and the facts that the court of Rome was therefore accessible only to bribes, and that the clergy were pillaged by the payment of an annual tax to support the papal court, were standing grievances. The states of the church were too poor to support the pontiff, and the whole world was therefore put under contribution. When the English parliament strove to stop these exactions and usurpations, the clergy were threatened with excommunication, and the sentence, which would probably have anticipated the action of Henry the Eighth by a century, was only stopped by the opportune death of Martin the Fifth. To the political economy of the age, which looked on the possession of the precious metals as the most solid and substantial wealth, the constant outflow of English money to Rome was not only a grievance, but a danger. Hence the relations of England and Rome were greatly strained in the fifteenth century, and the discontent which the experience of that time produced made it a comparatively easy matter for Henry in the next century to stimulate the discontent till it became a rupture, and that without any serious opposition from the hierarchy and the parochial clergy—

from no one indeed but from the monks, whose peculiar privileges depended on the continuous power of the papacy. Gascoigne compares the monks to the Shechemites in Genesis, and their policy to that of the prince of that city.

But these kinds of taxation or usurpation were as nothing to the scandals which arose when the exigencies of the Roman court suggested the use of these irregular expedients by which money might be obtained. The proceedings of Tetzels in Germany, which first roused the denunciations of Luther, were not so bad or so scandalous as those of Peter de Monte in England during the year 1440. The circumstances are so singularly like those which accompanied the better-known event that they may be stated more in detail for the modern reader, from Gascoigne's manuscript.

During the last years of the Greek empire, when the last monarchs of the East possessed little more than Constantinople, a strip of territory near it, and the relics of their famous navy, overtures were made to the West for aid against the Turks, who had not only Constantinople in their grasp, but were menacing Eastern Europe through the valley of the Danube. Through the mediation of the council of Basle and the action of Eugenius the Fourth, there seemed some prospect of aid, provided the Greeks would renounce their schism and be reconciled to the Western church. The bargain was struck, and turned out unluckily for the empire, for they did not get the assistance, and the reconciliation of the hapless emperor and his court seemed a hateful apostasy to those Greeks who remained attached to the faith of their forefathers. In a few years Constantinople fell, the Turks passed up the valley of the Danube, and were menacing Eastern Europe, when the great Hunniades completely vanquished them at the battle of Belgrade, which was fought on July 22, 1456.

The expenses said to have been incurred by Eugenius in bringing about the union of the Greek and Latin churches formed the plea for the issue of a commission for the sale of indulgences. An indulgence was the remission of some canonical obligation incumbent on all believers, but not in itself a moral obligation or intrinsic duty, or was a revision or renewal of some act of penance imposed for discipline's sake by an inferior ecclesiasti-

cal officer, but from which an appeal could be made to a superior. It is almost needless to add that at first these indulgences were granted on their own merits, and without charge. Soon there grew up a system of levying fees for registration and other clerical work in connection with the issue of these documents. Next a fine was paid for the grant, and lastly they were manufactured wholesale, to be sold retail by collectors appointed in each European kingdom. On this occasion Peter de Monte, a Lombard priest, was sent as collector to England.

"These pardons," says Gascoigne, "were sold in blank, the purchasers putting their own names in, or those of the parties to whom they resold them. They could be purchased as cheaply as for twopence, sometimes they were given for a stoup of wine or a flagon of beer, frequently they were made stakes at a game of chance, not uncommonly they were the hire of prostitutes. Men went about the country with panniers full of them, hawking them in every town and market. And the moral consequences were visible everywhere. Men said, 'I do not care what sins I commit or what crimes I practise, for I shall have easily, quickly, and cheaply plenary forgiveness for every sin by the pope's indulgence and absolution, which I can buy for fourpence or sixpence, or win by gambling. Rome itself has come to our doors.' In perfect justice Alfonso, king of Aragon, could say as he said to Eugenius, 'The Roman Church is now truly a harlot, since she offers herself for money to any who approaches her.'"

The pope, it seems, was not always safe of his agents, for my author adds that Peter de Monte, when he was leaving England with the vast treasure which he had collected, told one of Gascoigne's friends, Master Vincent Clement, with an oath, "The pope shall never have a penny out of these sacksful of money unless he give me written pledges that he will make me archbishop of Milan." The man did not get what he expected, but as he was made bishop of Brescia, it may be inferred that Eugenius acquired the treasure which he sent Peter de Monte to collect.

It was in vain for the pious and orthodox priest, in answer to the taunts of the Lollards, to say that these indulgences were naught if the buyers thought that they were freed from crimes



against the moral law by purchasing the pope's indulgence. Where a ceremonial law is strict and its observances are minute, two dangers are sure to arise. Men think they satisfy moral law by close adherence to the ceremony; or when they are conscious that there is a moral law which lies beyond the ceremony, they are unable or unwilling to determine the boundaries of either, and still less able or willing to believe that a remission which they are taught to look on as a relief from the gravest penalties imposed on the breach of a ceremonial obligation is not equally valid against the penalties consequent on the violation of a moral duty, or even a positive law of the land in which they live. The indulgences of Eugenius the Fourth and Peter de Monte created the criminals whom the law punished.

When the master of the Roman Church was so sordid and unscrupulous (and I must remind my reader that I am stating the case in the words of an orthodox and pious son of Rome, who loathed every form of heresy and schism, as they were then understood, with genuine horror), it was not to be expected that the hierarchy of the English Church would be much more useful to the cause which they proposed to serve. They openly defended the practices by which they had gained their rank and wealth, and saw no more harm in bribing the Roman court for a see than they did in paying the dues on succession to a temporal estate. The bishops never went near their sees, except to collect their rents in harvest-time, and Gascoigne quotes rather strangely Proverbs vii. 19, 20 as an illustration of their practices. Kemp, who had been bishop of London, afterwards archbishop of York, and finally archbishop of Canterbury, having previously served as a soldier in Henry the Fifth's wars, during the twenty-eight years that he was archbishop of York never visited his diocese, and allowed his mansion to fall into ruin. Twice elected cardinal, he never went to Rome. During the years which immediately preceded the fall of the House of Lancaster, six of the English bishops were in regular attendance at the court, fulfilling various secular functions and holding various offices of state; hated by the people whom they robbed and neglected, not daring to trust themselves among their people, and yet emulating the expedients of the Roman see in practising on those who were credulous, and from whom they could, on one

plea or the other, extort money. "I heard a man say in his sermon," Gascoigne observes, "let all present know that if any of you gives me or any of my house one penny, he is free from any penance imposed on him by his own curate or any other priest." The passage is as strong as any of the fictions of Von Hutten. I have already adverted to the readiness with which these prelates turned to either side, like Bunyan's Mr. Anything or Mr. Facingbothways, during the great war of succession.

It is well known that the Roman Church, tho it insisted on the formal celibacy of the clergy, licensed an irregular relation between the sexes in the case of parish priests. Such a custom seems to have generally prevailed in South Wales. Now we are told by my author that the clergy of the diocese of St. David's waited on their bishop, one De la Bere, and begged him to prohibit the practice and revoke his licenses. "I shall do nothing of the kind," answered the bishop. "Were I to do so I should lose four hundred marks of annual income (£266 13s. 4d.)<sup>\*</sup> which I get for these licenses, for I get a noble (6s. 8d.) or more from each of you for the license, and I do not intend to make such a sacrifice." Now there is little doubt that the story, which is certainly true in fact, indicates that there still existed a married clergy in South Wales, and that the license was merely a charge intended to levy a tax on what was a customary and recognized practice. But to the mind of an orthodox churchman of the fifteenth century such an answer from a bishop was absolutely scandalous, and no wonder that Gascoigne calls him, though he was living when the story was told, a man of abominable memory.

But the principal grievance which my author finds with the bishops, after he has dealt with the corruption by which they won their sees, the persistence with which, having bought their dignity, they neglected their duties, the scandalous absorption in secular business and secular pleasure which characterized them, and the rapacity with which they fleeced their flocks, was their cowardly inhibition of preaching except under a license, for which they exacted a round fee.

It is highly probable that the denunciations of the Lollard preachers alarmed the English episcopate. If the preacher could be caught and his guilt could be brought home to him, short

work was made of the obnoxious sectary. But many persons sympathized with that part of the Lollard creed which dealt with discipline ; more persons were at one with them when they denounced the see of Rome, for resistance to the pretensions of the papal court was in the air. It is probable, too, that the contempt of the Lollards for relics and images, which they rarely took pains to conceal, was shared by many who did not enroll themselves among the number of the sectaries. All men, too, who were engaged in purely political business looked with a jealous eye on the enormous wealth of the secular and regular clergy, and would have eagerly stripped them of their superfluities—Gascoigne himself would have done so—on any decent pretext. It is probable that the peculiar doctrinal tenets of Wiclif were seldom promulgated except to the initiated, unless the preacher was incautious or was entrapped by a false friend. A great deal, therefore, might be said by the preachers which would be irritating enough to the hierarchy, but would not come within the laws against heresy. To meet the difficulty, Archbishop Arundel established, with the consent of his bishops, a canon that no person should preach without the bishop's license, and induced the king to enroll his canon in the acts of Parliament. In order to stop the mouths of a few heretics they silenced all those of the clergy who could not or would not pay the sum which the bishop might levy on them at his discretion. Nay, they went further. In order to prevent any unpleasant truth from coming to the king's ears they allowed no one to preach before him till they had inspected his sermon and expunged all passages which they disliked, or had made him swear that he would prophesy soft things.

Henry the Sixth was always a child. He was probably made permanently timid by the brutal usage which he received in childhood from his governor, Warwick, and he was predisposed to a kind of melancholia from his birth. But he was sincerely pious, kind-hearted, and affectionate. He was so gentle that in the midst of that ferocious quarrel which found its plea in the war of succession he was disliked by no man. To his own party he was almost a saint, who was indeed incapable of government, but must be blessed by Heaven. To the Yorkist party he was a gentle, inoffensive usurper, the continuance of whose reign un-

der a permanent protectorate, with a parliamentary title recognizing the hereditary right and subsequent succession of the Duke of York, was the best solution of the question as to how Margaret and her son could be set aside, a revolution avoided, and the old quarrel with France taken up under happier auspices. I know few stories more descriptive of the king's mind than one which my author tells. Gascoigne waited on him at Windsor in order to obtain a charter or ordinance by which the Chancellor of Oxford or his deputy was to be *ex officio* a magistrate. The king readily granted the request, and then said, "Master Gascoigne, how comes it that so learned a man as you has never been made a bishop?" "Sir king," Gascoigne answered, "I would sooner be a respectable cobbler than one of your bishops." The undignified character of such a question in the mouth of the official bishop-maker, and the plain-spoken answer of the scholar, are curiously illustrative of the men and the times.

The preachers of the orthodox party suffered more by Arundel's injunction than the Lollards did, just as peaceful travellers are annoyed and hampered by passports while conspirators easily evade police regulations. Men who for conscience' sake were ready to risk their lives, and who knew that the archbishop's injunction was aimed at them, were not likely to be silenced, while those who would have done their best in the service of ecclesiastical order were muzzled. Hence Gascoigne speaks of the archbishop's death as a manifest judgment. He was seized with palsy of the tongue, so that he could neither speak nor swallow, and so died.

The indiscipline of the church was aggravated by the devices of lawyers. In the earlier ages of the church the bishops had not only exercised discipline over the parochial clergy, but had even assumed an authority, in examining into the qualifications of those who were presented to benefices, which was distasteful to patrons. Hence, three centuries before this time, Henry the Second had provided that the patronage of those who had the presentation to benefices should be inspected, and the writ *quare impedit* was devised as a check to the bishop. But in those times a further hindrance was put on goodly discipline. Corrupt parons and simoniacal priests worried the better bishops by vexa-

tious actions in the Court of Arches, and many an ill-doer was able to retain his place in consequence of the aid which legal chicanery gave him. The spirit of litigation was strongly developed in the fifteenth century, when the country had become more opulent than ever before in its history, and affected the church as well as secular business, to the great injury of genuine discipline.

The learning of the universities had greatly decayed. Gascoigne states that a century before his time there were 30,000 students at Oxford, as he knew from counting the names in the rolls of his predecessors in office. They came from all parts of the civilized world, and having gained such learning as the place afforded them, carried back the system to the new universities of Eastern Europe. Thus it was that the teaching of Wiclif was introduced into Bohemia by students of that remote region who had come under Wiclif's influence, where it was strengthened by the instruction given and the literature imparted by two English graduates, Peter Clark and Payne, whose disciples were John Huss and Jerome of Prague, the confessors at the Council of Constance, whose execution caused the outbreak of the Taborites and Calixtins in Bohemia, and familiarized the whole of this part of Christendom with resistance to the pretensions of the papal court and the doctrines of the Latin Church. But the repressive regulations which had been put on religious opinion in the University of Oxford, the obligation which had been imposed on all graduates to repudiate the leading tenets of Wiclif's school, the general decline of manners, and the desire to stand well with noble and episcopal patrons, had depraved Oxford, so that she had become a shadow of her former self.

The writer to whom I have referred so much was a zealous preacher. He laments indeed over his shortcomings, and dwells on his physical infirmities, but appears to have used every occasion on which he could occupy the pulpit. It seems that at this time there were two kinds of sermon, that on a text and that on a theme, the latter being the oldest form of discourse, and that which he preferred himself. A specimen sermon, however, of the former kind is copied into his work, probably because it was among the papers of which his will directed the careful transcription. His text is, "By the waters of Babylon we sat down



and wept, when we remembered Sion." "As," he says, "the tribes of Judah and Benjamin and Jerusalem, while in the Babylonish captivity, uttered these words, so the sons of the heavenly Jerusalem, looking at the ill which is done in the confusion of the church, weep and wail because seven great mischiefs, like seven streams, drown and choke many in sin and punishment, while innumerable calamities, like rivulets drawn away from the main currents, are derived from these seven streams of Babylon. The seven are: 1. The unworthy and wicked ordination and appointment, which is called promotion, of bishops, rectors, and officers. 2. The absence of good pastors from the guidance of the people, which is as bad as the absence of the seaman when the ship is in peril of wreck. 3. The practice of giving pluralities to one man, when each flock should have its shepherd. 4. The appropriation of churches and tithes to monasteries. 5. The abuse of absolution, when the priest releases men who are not truly penitent and converted. 6. The abuse of indulgences, and their acceptance as an equivalent for the discharge of duty to God and man. 7. The abuse of dispensation and of licenses given by man and not for the gain or safety of souls." On each of these topics the preacher dilates at length, always earnestly, and sometimes with considerable force of eloquence.

The reader will see that the discretionary employment of any and all the expedients enumerated and criticised by Gascoigne were the special prerogatives of the Roman see, and the foundation of all its authority. It assumed a censorship over all ecclesiastical patronage, even when it did not claim the direct bestowal of it. It loaded foreign and non-resident ecclesiastics with dignities which, rightly held, involved laborious duties. Its chief favorites were invariably pluralists. It strengthened its hold on the people by enriching the regular clergy, who were, to a far greater extent than the secular, in direct dependence on the Roman see. It claimed to be the source of sacerdotal absolution, and to supersede every other authority and every other claim of discipline. The basis of its finance was the traffic in indulgences, the significance of which was readily and regularly misunderstood by those who bought them; and lastly it claimed a general jurisdiction, in every conceivable case, to dispense with, if not to annul, any law, religious or civil, and to

confer any license, even to do things in their own nature immoral and unlawful. To attack, and to attack circumstantially, these leading principles of papal authority was to virtually denounce and reject it. No wonder, then, that Gascoigne's work did not become, as he fondly imagined it would be, a means for instructing men in the evils of his time and in the process of an internal reformation, but that it was quietly dropped into the library of a small Oxford college, where it has remained practically undisturbed and unread for centuries, and especially in a college which was founded for the express purpose of refuting the tenets of Wiclif, out of which, however, in the lapse of time came an even greater man than Wiclif—John Wesley.

The author always, indeed, speaks with profound reverence of the pope, addresses him in the customary phrases of his time, and seems to sincerely believe that he is anxious to deal justly with all interests and reform all abuses. "It used to be," he says, "a common belief that the pope retired thrice a day to commune with God, and to learn what should be allowed and what should be annulled. This *credulitas vulgi*," as he describes it, "suggests an important truth, that the divine guidance is necessary for the ruler of Christendom and should be sought by him. In practice, however, the action of the pope, which is probably well-intentioned, is marred by his surroundings. The cardinals, the councillors, the officials of the papal court are a herd of rapacious and hungry adventurers, who generally prevent their master from forming a right judgment, and when he has by force of character or special guidance issued a wise decree, they take care by interpolations and similar devices to entirely pervert his best intentions. Added to this, he is exposed to their constant and sordid importunity till, wearied out by the clamor, he yields that which he knows at the time that he is wrong in granting." Now it is impossible to be deceived by such a manner of speech. The trick of transferring to the ministers and counsellors of a ruler the misdeeds of which the ruler's government is full is a convenient fiction, but has never, as far as history teaches us, been sufficient, when people's minds are made up that the government is intolerable, to shield the authority of the ruler himself.

From John the Twenty-second, deposed in 1315, down to

the middle of the fifteenth century the popes, tho far from reaching to the lofty ideal of the thirteenth-century pontiffs, were respectable rulers of the church. Later on, the pontificate was greatly deteriorated. The scandalous life of Alexander the Sixth, the warlike activity of Julius the Second, and the voluptuous scepticism of Leo the Tenth all contributed to make the reformation a necessity. But it is more than probable that had the succession been as reputable as it was in the first half of the fifteenth century, the nations of Teutonic origin would have broken away from the papacy, even tho they might have retained the tenets and upheld the discipline of the Latin Church. As yet there was one thing wanting to men like Gascoigne, who wished to reform Latin Christianity without departing from its tenets by a hair's breadth, and men like the obscure but zealous followers of Wiclif, who longed for the means by which they could alter doctrines which they believed to be contrary to the Scriptures. This want was the *apparatus criticus* of scholarship, a want which was supplied by the Renaissance. The destruction of the Eastern empire was not an unmixed evil. Before Constantinople fell, Greek scholars came over to Italy, bringing with them the precious relics of Hellenic genius, a theology which knew nothing of the Decretals, and a philosophy which came more home to men's sympathies than that of Aquinas and the tribe of schoolmen. The advent of this literature was hailed with delight. The new art of printing was quickly transferred to Italy, and under papal protection, in printing-presses set up by monasteries, as well as in the free city of Venice, those works were eagerly published which were very speedily to shatter the very power to which they owed their earliest patronage. The new learning gave the movement what it lacked—authority. People began to examine the credentials of that which they had hitherto received as an oracle of God, and gradually became more and more persuaded that it was no better than the counsel of Achitophel, a favorite illustration with the divines of the early reformation. But in Gascoigne's day the scholarship of England was at its lowest ebb. The Latin familiarly written was full of barbarisms, was a learned *patois*. There was no knowledge of Greek whatever, and it was from Greek that the thinkers of the sixteenth century created those solvents

which destroyed among the Teutonic races that authority which had hitherto been unchallenged, tho the object for many a weary year of bitter and incessant murmurings.

From the day that Erasmus, More, and Colet introduced the new learning into England the march of events was irresistible and inevitable. The descendant of the Lollard and the descendant of the orthodox and devout Churchman, tho still bitter rivals, and even angry enemies, were simultaneously working out the problem of which the Anglican Church was the result. Had not the ambition of Wolsey constrained him to keep on good terms with the papal court, in hopes of rising to the pontificate, he could, I am persuaded, have guided Henry during the crisis of the first reformation, that which renounced Rome, established Anglicanism, but kept to the tenets of the Latin Church. The change was worked out in a coarser fashion by Wolsey's servant Cromwell, and tho the teachers of the old faith held their own in Henry's time, and were depressed by the advocates of the new gospel in his son's days, the reaction under Mary did not intend the renewal of the old dependence of the national church on the see of Rome, a policy which was furthered by Cardinal Pole, but resisted as far as possible by men like Gardiner and Bonner, those names which are so unsavory to succeeding generations. Elizabeth consulted her own interests when she deferred to the inclinations of her subjects in again breaking off relations with the Roman see, and tho it is probable that at the commencement of her reign the majority of her people was attached to the old faith, she did not run any danger from domestic malcontents till the pope had created for himself a new army in the disciples of Loyola.

These two streams of critical puritanism and conservative Anglicanism have run in the same channel since the age of Elizabeth, but they had their sources respectively in the teachings of Wiklif and in the growth of that national English party in the church which had resolved to be on distant terms with Rome as soon as opportunity offered. Both were in existence in the fifteenth century. They flowed in the same stream when under the strong rule of Elizabeth; nonconformity outside the Anglican communion was feeble, but the strife within the same communion was getting fiercer. The puritan wished to purge

the church of tenets and of ceremonies which implied tenets. The Laudian relation, to all appearance successful for a time, was Anglican, as opposed to Roman, to the core, but was ready to adopt a multitude of pre-reformation doctrines and practices. Then came the upheaval of the great civil war, and the temporary submergence of all that Laud had done, and more which he found to his hand, in the religious anarchy of the Protectorate. The strife of creeds and the weariness which followed on the strife gave an opportunity for the re-establishment of a far more political church than any which had been known in England before. But the church of the Restoration had no energy except in persecuting, chiefly for political reasons, those nonconformists who now, for the first time, determined to live outside the Establishment, instead of striving to reconstruct the church from within. It is possible that had it not been for the strongly political character of the Anglican Church the Comprehension Bill might have become the law of the Revolution. But all things were against it. The puritan element finally quitted the national church in England, and has thenceforward become English nonconformity.

One effort was made to purify the English Church from within during the eighteenth century. Of course I allude to the movement of the Wesleys. The Anglican element in the church had degenerated into the Tory High Church faction, which made a hero of Sacheverel, or had been manipulated, in order to aid Jacobite plots, by Atterbury, who was a more restless intriguer. The principal clergy in the great towns were Whigs, whose theology was a scarcely disguised Arianism. Many of the Independents and all the Presbyterians in England had become avowed Unitarians. At this crisis, when the religious spirit was nearly extinct in the Anglican Church, the Wesleys strove to bring back faith, piety, and discipline. How they labored, and why they were thrust out, is known to all who have studied the history of that remarkable movement. Take away the doctrinal theology of Gascoigne and the surroundings of his time, and estimate his piety, his zeal, his passion for a revived discipline, his advocacy of preaching and a holy life, his belief in the moral influence of good example, his disinterestedness, and his untiring anxiety for the saving of



men's souls, and one could almost fancy that the sons of the Epworth parson, who determined on reviving, by the work of their lives, the Christianity which they saw nearly extinct, must have stumbled on those two great folios of the mediæval scholar and divine, whose pages have assisted me in forming a judgment on the religious faith of the fifteenth century, when zeal could be found, and to have aided in fulfilling his pious wish that succeeding ages would learn how the want of duty to God and man bring their swift and assured punishment with them.

The student of modern history, *i.e.*, the student of those forces which collectively have made or marred civilization—marred it by the Roman empire, made it by slowly combating against the barbarism which destroyed Rome, and the cunning which borrowed the worst faults of the Roman empire, its Cæsarism and its centralization—always must remember two rules. The first is that the meaning of the present can only be understood by gathering and mingling those facts of the past to which that which is now developed and living is the successor and inheritor. The other is that social forces do not die, that man invents nothing in himself, whatever be his victories over nature, and that therefore the aims and purposes of the best and worst forces in bygone days are constantly reproduced in later times. If men will study history on these lines, the past is always the genuine ancestor of the present, the men of our own time may be seen to renew the life and aims of our forefathers, and the narrative of events becomes a living picture, a drama in which the actors have framed what we have to manipulate, have made us, in great part, what we are, and are therefore still among us. Again, as man cannot travel out of himself, but must be bounded by his own consciousness, human societies are perpetually engaged with the same problems of thought and action, and are therefore, consciously or unconsciously, reproducing the same efforts which bygone generations have made before them.

The form of the Anglican Church of the fifteenth century has in one sense passed away. The opulence of its bishops and mitred abbots, their monopoly of employment in all the affairs of state (except the rude warfare of that time, tho they sometimes shared in military campaigns), their lavish expendi-

ture on great churches, and the jealous hostility which they exhibited against all who criticised the institutions which they administered, are now mere history, which exists in annals and in monuments. Very slowly the hierarchy was driven from its intrenchments. The last lawyer-churchman held the great seal at the beginning of the seventeenth century, the last finance minister who sat among the bishops held office just before the Long Parliament, the last diplomatist which the same order supplied negotiated the treaty of Utrecht in 1712, just before the time in which (except in the case of the Roman Catholics) a tacit toleration was granted to all separatists. But tho in successive ages the Anglican Church lost much, it retained, and still retains, a great deal of that which the Anglican of the fifteenth century longed for and the Anglican of the sixteenth achieved, while the English Establishment in the nineteenth century, some notable changes excepted, is not wholly unlike what the orthodox reformer of the fifteenth desired.

To preach the Gospel constantly, and to dwell in that preaching on the obligations of duty, by strengthening the duty, and by insisting on the need which the believer has to satisfy his conscience and his God, to give proof of a living faith by a good example of life and by discreet charity, to combat everything which, whether it be among clergy or laymen, lowers the rule of life or discredits the Christian profession, is the field of action which Gascoigne put before himself four centuries ago, and does not differ materially from that which a zealous divine would put before himself now. But such a person, when he lives among those whose standard and practice, whose discipline and system, are unlike his, is as much a controversialist as he is an evangelist, resists the errors of his day as well as preaches the identical gospel of all time, instructs the student of the past, and is in harmony with the theologian of the present.

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